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EXCEPTING CREDIT CARD DEBT FROM DISCHARGE
IN BANKRUPTCY: WHY FRAUD CAN'T MEAN
WHAT THE COURTS WANT IT TO MEAN
LARRY BATES*
I. THE PROBLEM
Almost everyone agrees that over the past ten years, the number of
consumer bankruptcies in the United States has risen at an alarming rate.1
What no one agrees about is why that has happened. 2 It seems counter-
intuitive that bankruptcies could be on the rise when the signs of a roaring
economy were all around us. 3 Of course, as the economy grew at record
paces, so too did consumers' appetites for the materialistic symbols of
success and prosperity.4 As the "new" economy continued to re-perfect its
* Associate Professor, Baylor University Law School. B.A., 1978, University of Minnesota;
J.D., 1983, Marquette University School of Law; LL.M., 1986, Harvard Law School.
1. The total number of non-business bankruptcy filings in the United States rose from
718,107 in 1990 to 1,217,628 in 2000. Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, 1990-2000,
By Quarter, American Bankruptcy Institute, available at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/
newstatsfront.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002). Personal bankruptcies reached an all-time high of
1.38 million filings in 1998. 1d; see also Bankruptcy Will Be Back in the Headlines, SMR
Predicts, CREDIT CARD NEWS, Oct. 1, 2000, at 4. Though the number of non-business filings
declined in 1999 and 2000, experts predicted the sharp increase in filings in 2001 would result in a
record number of filings. Research Firm Sees 'Flood of Filings' in 2001, CONSUMER BANKR.
NEWS, Dec. 28, 2000, at 3.
2. See, e.g., Charles M. Foster & Stephen L. Poe, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Proposal to Re-
form Chapters 7 and 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 104 DICK. L. REV. 579, 584 (2000) (noting
creditors' claims that debtors have abused the bankruptcy system); David A. Moss & Gibbs A.
Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 311, 328-34 (1999) (summarizing theories regarding the increase in consumer bankruptcies,
including the ease and attractiveness of filing, the declining social stigma attached to filing, and
the changes in the distribution of consumer credit); Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 34, 44 (1998)
(questioning whether the consumer bankruptcy explosion was a result of abuse by debtors or
extension of credit to individuals without the income to pay the debts).
3. See Sommer, supra note 2, at 34 (stating "the growth in bankruptcy filings is not a
response to the economy").
4. The United States has experienced economic expansion for more than ten years, the
longest in American history. Economic Expansion to Continue into Record-Setting 1 1th Year,
Indiana University, available at http://www.iuinfo.indiana.edu/ocm/releases/forecastOl.htm (Nov.
9, 2000); see also What's Up Today Economic Expansion Officially Becomes a Record Today, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 2000, at B1 [hereinafter ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH]; Merrill
Goozner, Economy's Record Growth Doesn't Compute for Some, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, at 1.
However, even at the height of this growth, consumer debt rose to more than $1 trillion in 1997,
about one-seventh of the gross national product in the United States and 128 times the trade
deficit. Vicki W. Travis, Comment, Of the Latest Attempted Revisions to the Bankruptcy Code:
Can They Really Change Anything?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 221, 221 (1999); see also Falling into the
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vision of life in the twenty-first century, consumers stood ready to purchase
their way into the new century at whatever cost. 5  And why not? The
meteoric rise of the stock market had made us all millionaires-well, at
least based on the projected value of our 40lks and the like.6 But why wait
until age sixty-five to enjoy the anticipated life of the rich and famous when
VISA, MasterCard, and American Express-to name the "big" few-were
more than willing to accommodate our earthly desires today?7 Not only
were they willing to accommodate, they seemed to insist upon it, sending us
countless opportunities every year to extend our purchasing power-our
ability to buy on credit.8 We no longer had to call and ask for a credit card;
we simply had to check our mail to discover that we had been pre-approved
for credit cards we never knew existed.9 We also were enticed to use
them-immediately-by special offers like the "low introductory interest
rates" offer that seemed to accompany every invitation to further extend our
indebtedness. 10
One not so surprising consequence of VISA's and the others'
generosity is that credit card debt also grew at a meteoric pace during this
period.Il In fact, the pace at which credit card debt grew exceeded the pace
Black Hole of Debt, the New Economic Worry, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/money/consumerbudget/mdebt001.htm (July 13, 1999). While credit card profits
have soared during the economic growth, so too have the number of bankruptcy filings. Credit
Card Profits Soar While Issuers Push Bankruptcy Reform, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Mar. 22,
2001, at 3; Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV.
177, 177-78.
5. See ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, supra note 4 (stating consumer confidence is at record
highs).
6. See Goozner, supra note 4 (stating "the population... revels when the Dow... soars").
7. Thomas J. McCarthy, A House of Cards, AMERICA, Oct. 28, 2000, at 6.
8. Id.
"Pre-approved," "pre-selected," and "deserve" are mainstays of the genre [of credit
card company solicitations]. The idea, summed up in a sentence like, "You've worked
hard to establish an outstanding credit record, and it's time you were rewarded with
one card that recognizes your level of achievement," is that you have arrived. The
question is, Where? In this and every other respect, the fine print proves instructive.
It informs me that "pre-approved" means only that I "have been pre-approved to
receive this offer."
Id.
9. Id.
10. See id (tongue-in-cheek discussion of pre-approved credit cards); see also Jason Cantone,
U. Illinois: Mail Solicitations Hit the Nation by Storm, U-Wire, available at 2000 WL 28356961
(Oct. 26, 2000) (noting that credit card companies delivered 992 million credit card solicitations
during a three-month period in 2000); Marcy Gordon, Credit Bill May Remove "Safety Net" of
Disabled, DENVER POST, Oct. 27, 2000, at CI0 (noting that credit card companies solicit to
disabled individuals, including those with mental disabilities).
11. See Foster & Poe, supra note 2, at 590 (stating that credit card companies flood the
market with offers without promoting good spending habits).
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at which personal income grew during the same period.12 But how could
that happen? Isn't credit availability somehow connected to income? Not
if you want to make money, loads of money. Indeed, income seems to have
become irrelevant to credit availability, at least of the credit card variety.' 3
The major credit card issuers solicit students, the unemployed, and even
people who are proceeding through bankruptcy.' 4 What makes these
groups of people, and many others marginally getting by, so attractive to
card issuers is their propensity to charge a great deal, to carry high balances
on their accounts, and to make only the minimum monthly payments
required on each account. 15 The risk that one more credit card with its
minimum monthly payments will trigger a complete collapse of the debtor's
12. Americans' disposable personal income has risen substantially during the expansion of
the U.S. economy during the past several years. Despite Earning More, Americans Save Less,
GRAPHICS ARTS MONTHLY, May 1, 2000, at 18. In 1998 and 1999, for example, disposable
personal income increased by about four percent per year. Id. However, outstanding credit card
loans increased dramatically during the 1990s, rising from less than $110 billion in 1992 to more
than $150 billion in 1996, the highest level in the decade. Joanna Stavins, Credit Card Borrow-
ing, Delinquency, and Personal Bankruptcy, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., July/Aug. 2000, at 17.
Moreover, the savings rate in the United States sank to an all-time low in 2000. Yochi J. Dreazen,
Rate at Which Consumers Save Sinks to a Record, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2000, at A2; Nicholas
Kulish, U.S. Savings Rate Hits an All-Time Low, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2000, at A2.
13. See Sommer, supra note 2, at 37-38 (describing credit card companies' willingness to go
deeper into the risk pool).
14. See Sarah Hale, More Students are Falling into Credit Card Debt Finances, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2001, at Cl (noting credit card debt of many college students, even those who are
unemployed); see also Rhea R. Borja, College Credit: The Average Debt a Student Carries Has
Grown 46 Percent in Two Years, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al (noting
more about credit card debt of college students); Mary Judice, Students Need Credit-Card
Lessons, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 27, 2000, at 4 (describing more about college
students' credit card debt); Teresa Dixon Murray, More People Use Bankruptcy to Eliminate
Oppressive Debts, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, July 17, 2000, at B3 (noting that unemployed people
are sometimes offered credit lines of $50,000 or more); Michelle Singletary & Albert B.
Crenshaw, Credit Card Flood Leaves Sea of Debt, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1996, at Al (noting that
credit card companies often send pre-approved credit card applications to individuals who had
recently filed for bankruptcy); Brian Meyer, Yule be Sorry: Too Much Credit Debt Can Ruin Your
Holiday, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 22, 1998, at B1 (describing more about credit card companies'
credit card mailings).
15. Falling Into the Black Hole of Debt, the New Economic Worry, Money, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/consumer/budget/mdebt00l.htm (July 13, 1999).
Consider what happens when only the minimum monthly payment is made every
month, a common practice among many cardholders. On an $1,800 balance at 18%
interest, it would take 22 years and four months to pay. The interest charges would
total $3,797, making your total payment $5,597.
Why do banks lend to people who might not repay? The answer is simple: Profits
from good accounts more than offset losses. For every 100 accounts kept current only
two or three go bad. Bankers know that most people will make minimum payments to
avoid hurting their credit records.
2002]
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financial affairs is more than outweighed by the potential profits that might
be collected from debtors living in a state of perpetual indebtedness.16
But when the walls do come crashing down, many of these debtors will
seek refuge in bankruptcy, where, much to their surprise, they will find
VISA and the others waiting to punish them for accepting the invitation to
buy on credit. 17 The punishment of choice has been to challenge a debtor's
right in bankruptcy to discharge his debts. When the challenge is suc-
cessful, the debtor emerges from bankruptcy still burdened by the credit
card debt that finally forced him into bankruptcy. Although credit card
debts are not specifically excepted from discharge under the Bankruptcy
Code, card issuers have succeeded in preventing the discharge of such debts
by establishing that they were incurred as a result of fraud by the debtor.18
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge: "any
debt ... (2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-(A) false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition." 19
Fraud was not a ground for excepting debts from discharge under
American bankruptcy law prior to the enactment of the new Bankruptcy
Code in 1978.20 Indeed, the term fraud had been used, more or less, as a
term of art to describe any conduct of a debtor that was considered
dishonest because it was an affront to the bankruptcy process. 21 Thus, fraud
did not connote conduct that was creditor-specific, but rather it described
conduct that impeded the process of liquidating the debtor's assets and
distributing the proceeds to creditors. Initially, fraud was limited to the
debtor's conduct during the bankruptcy case itself-concealing assets from
the trustee, falsely testifying under oath in connection with the case, or
conspiring with a creditor to assert a false claim against the bankruptcy
estate.22 Later, fraud also came to include the debtor's pre-petition conduct
that had a similar effect on the bankruptcy process-transferring assets in
contemplation of bankruptcy or colluding to prefer certain creditors.23
16. Id.
17. See Singletary & Crenshaw, supra note 14 (using a bankruptcy filing example where
$35,000 of debts totaling $38,000 (subtracting the mortgage debt) was credit card debt).
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).
20. One exception was where the fraud was committed by a fiduciary. See 11 U.S.C. §
17(a)(4) (repealed 1978).
21. See discussion infra Part III.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
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Underlying this concept of fraud as generally dishonest conduct was a
sense of what we might call the bankruptcy bargain: as consideration for
discharge, the debtor would cooperate with his creditors in the collection
and liquidation of his assets. When the debtor was dishonest, when his
conduct worked to frustrate the process of collecting and liquidating, there
was a failure of consideration, and the debtor was not entitled to a discharge
of his debts. Conduct that frustrated the bankruptcy process harmed
creditors generally, and thus it was appropriate to impose a punishment that
operated to protect creditors in general. The failure of consideration that
resulted when the debtor was dishonest was complete; there was nothing to
exchange for the discharge of any debt, and accordingly no debt was
discharged. 24
If fraud is simply a term for dishonest conduct that works to harm
creditors generally, this would explain why courts applying the fraud excep-
tion in § 523 have struggled to conceptualize a fraud cause of action that
encompasses credit card debt. Section 523(a)(2) punishes debtors for
creditor-specific harm, not for harm to the bankruptcy process. 25 Thus, the
conduct traditionally associated with the term fraud in the bankruptcy
context would not provide a paradigm for the fraud exception in §
523(a)(2)(A). 26 Courts would have to look outside of bankruptcy to define
the term for § 523 purposes. That is, of course, what the courts have
done-defined fraud independently from its bankruptcy heritage. Courts
have resorted to fictions to fit these debts into a traditional common law
concept of fraud, which they have read into § 523(a)(2)(A), even though
there is no historical basis for doing so.
The courts have not consciously ignored the evolution of the term fraud
in bankruptcy law, but no court has made an exhaustive study of the term as
it has been used in American bankruptcy law. Instead, the courts have
noted the absence of the term from the predecessor of § 523 and assumed
that the term has no bankruptcy past. Based on their perception that the
term has no determinable bankruptcy meaning, the courts understandably
have looked elsewhere for a source from which to derive content for the
term. This article traces the evolution of the term fraud in the context of the
bankruptcy discharge by looking at the five bankruptcy acts that have been
in effect at various times during the past 200 years and concludes that the
courts have based their application of the fraud exception in § 523 to credit
card debts on mistaken assumptions. The article therefore argues that § 523
24. See discussion infra Part ml.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2000).
26. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
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cannot be used, without further action by Congress, to except credit card
debts from discharge.
II. THE CASES
The courts that have addressed credit card dischargeability take one of
three conceptual approaches to the problem of applying § 523 to such
cases.27 The most commonly applied approach is the implied representation
doctrine,28 which many courts have viewed as having been sanctioned to
some extent by the Supreme Court's decision in Field v. Mans.29 Other
courts have applied the assumption of risk doctrine that was developed
under section 17 of the 1898 Act. 30 Some have suggested that after the
Supreme Court decision in Field this approach is no longer viable; 31
however, at least one judge on the Fifth Circuit recently applied it to hold
against a creditor in a § 523 action. 32 Finally, there is the no representation
doctrine that has received little endorsement, even though it has been
grounded by analogy on Supreme Court precedent. 33 This too was resur-
rected recently by the original panel in AT&T Universal Card Services v.
Mercer (In re Mercer).34 Although markedly different in their application,
the three approaches have one thing in common: none is based on an
historical examination of the fraud exception to dischargeability under
American bankruptcy law. Instead, each reflects an attempt to discern the
"meaning" of the terms used in the fraud exception. This occurs
independent of any examination of how those terms were selected to
27. However, hybrids exist as well. See, e.g., Chevy Chase Bank v. Briese (In re Briese),
196 B.R. 440 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996); J.C. Penney Co. v. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R.
44 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 BR. 724
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985).
28. See, e.g., Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs. (In re Rembert), 141 F.3d 277 (6th
Cir. 1998); American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d
1122 (9th Cir. 1997); Chevy Chase Bank FSB v. Kukuk (In re Kukuk), 225 BR. 778 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 1998); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Searle (In re Searle), 223 B.R. 384 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1998); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Dietzel (In re Dietzel), 245 B.R. 747 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2000).
29. 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
30. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927 (11 th Cir. 1983); First
USA Bank v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 210 B.R. 212 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); FCC Nat'l Bank v.
Etto (In re Etto), 210 B.R. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997).
31. Gibson, Credit Card Dischargeability: Two Cheers for the Common Law and Some
Modest Proposals for Legislative Reform, 74 AM. BANK. L.J. 129, 139 (2000).
32. AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 211 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir.
2000), rev'd en banc, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001).
33. See Universal Bank, NA v. Kuntz (In re Kuntz), 249 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000);
Universal Bank, NA v. Rich (In re Rich), 249 B.R. 709 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000); AT&T
Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 BR. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1996).
34. 211 F.3d at 217-18, rev'd en banc, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001).
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embody the policy that dishonest debtors are not entitled to the benefits of a
discharge in bankruptcy.
A. THE IMPLIED REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE
The implied representation doctrine is a judicial fiction created to
overcome the reality that credit card debt, absent unusual circumstances,
would almost always be determined dischargeable under § 523.35 The
problem that the fiction wires around is the obvious absence of any actual
representation by the holder of a credit card upon use of the card. In the
ordinary credit card transaction, the act of presenting the card as payment
for the cardholder's purchase is accomplished without any express
representation by the cardholder with respect to the transaction. Even if the
cardholder had uttered some words that we could label a representation for
purposes of § 523, the card issuer was not there to receive such represen-
tation. 36 Even more problematic is the cash advance, where the transaction
occurs between cardholder and machine. 37 Although the courts can find
cardholder representations based on the credit card application, to the extent
these representations might be grounds for denying discharge of the debt
under § 523, they usually relate to the financial condition of the debtor and
thus are excluded as grounds under the fraud exception. 38 Section 523
makes clear that such representations, when in writing, can only be grounds
for denying discharge under § 523(2)(B), which imposes a more difficult
burden on the creditor. 39 Similarly, representations based on the docu-
mentation with the card supplied by the issuer are not usually sufficiently
35. See, e.g., Mercer, 246 F.3d at 421 & n.45; Citibank (S.D.), NA v. Eashai (In re Eashai),
87 F.3d 1082, 1097 (9th Cir. 1996); Citibank (S.D.), NA v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R.
653, 656 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988); AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Akdogan (In re Akdogan), 204
B.R. 90, 96 & n.4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re
Feld) 203 B.R. 360, 365-66 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
36. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 407; Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 656; Chase Manhattan Bank, NA v. Ford
(In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); see also David F. Snow, The Discharg-
eability of Credit Card Debt: New Developments and the Need for a Direction, 72 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 63, 68-69 (1998).
37. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724, 730
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985) (rejecting the argument that by using the credit card the debtor
represented he would comply with the terms of the application he submitted, stating that "[m]ere
violations of any contractual provisions do not constitute fraud").
39. Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2000) the creditor must establish that its reliance on
the debtor's representation was reasonable, a much more difficult burden in light of the often
minimal efforts creditors make to investigate a cardholder's credit-worthiness prior to issuing a
credit card. Snow, supra note 36, at 86-87; see also Mercer, 246 F.3d at 427 (Duhe, J.,
dissenting); Universal Bank v. Grause (In re Grause), 245 B.R. 95, 102-03 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000);
FCC Nat'l Bank v. Etto (In re Etto), 210 B.R. 734, 739-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997).
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connected to the debt under attack in the § 523 action, at least not for
common law fraud purposes.40
The implied representation doctrine is premised on the assumption that
Congress intended to incorporate the common law doctrine of fraud into §
523(a)(2)(A) as a ground for excepting debts from discharge.41 At common
law, a claim for fraud required the claimant to establish that (1) the
defendant made a representation, (2) the defendant knew the representation
was false at the time he made it, (3) the defendant made the representation
with the intent to deceive the claimant, (4) the claimant relied on the
representation, and (5) the claimant's alleged injury was caused by the
representation.42
The implied representation doctrine holds that the nature of the credit
card transaction is such that it is reasonable to attribute to the cardholder a
promise to pay the card issuer for each use of the card.43 A credit card
allows the holder to obtain goods or services for which the holder would
have been required to make immediate payment, but for the acceptance of
the card by the merchant or provider of services.44 The goods or services
are not being provided as gifts, and the holder understands that all the card
does is defer the obligation to pay for the goods or services she receives
now.45 Necessarily, then, the holder is promising to pay for the goods or
services, not today, but in the future and according to the terms of his
agreement with the card issuer.46 Thus, even though the cardholder need
not say anything during the transaction besides "here, take my card," and
even though the card issuer is not in sight, each party involved in the
transaction understands the role of the others: the merchant provides the
goods, the issuer pays the merchant for the goods, and ultimately the
cardholder reimburses the issuer for its payment to the merchant. 47 A
cardholder can hardly claim surprise when a court concludes that the legal
effect of handing the merchant his or her credit card constitutes a promise to
pay at some point for the goods purchased with the card.48
40. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 428-32 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 428.
42. See, e.g., Citibank (S.D.), NA v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1085-87 (9th Cir.
1996).
43. See, e.g., Mercer, 246 F.3d at 421 & n.45; Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1097; Citibank v.
Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653, 656 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988); AT&T Universal Card
Servs. v. Akdogan (In re Akdogan), 204 B.R. 90, 96 n.4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); AT&T
Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld) 203 B.R. 360, 365-66 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
44. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 406.
45. In addition, the holder will usually be able to spread the payments out over time. Id.
46. The holder agrees to make required monthly payments in some minimum amount. Id.
47. Id.
48. As one author has explained it:
.[VOL. 78:23
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Based on this reasoning, many courts have been willing to hold that
cardholders impliedly represent to the card issuer, whenever they use the
card, that they intend to pay for the credit they obtain by using the card.49
For example, the Ninth Circuit treats the cardholder/card issuer relationship
as a series of individual contracts.50 Each card transaction forms a uni-
lateral contract in which the cardholder promises to repay the debt incurred
and the card issuer performs by paying the merchant.5 ' By emphasizing the
contractual nature of the transaction, the court gains access to contract-
based rules that impose-imply--certain representations based only on the
formation of the contract.52 The most important of these is the represen-
tation that by entering into the contract, the parties have impliedly promised
to perform according to its terms.53 Thus, where the cardholder agreement
conditions use of the card on repayment by the cardholder, the court can
easily imply a promise to perform that agreement, to repay the charges
incurred with each use of the card. 54
In AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Akdogan (In re Akdogan),55
the court accepted the implied representation theory because, in the court's
view, it would be incongruous to apply the elements of common law fraud
to credit card transactions but to preclude implied representations.56
Requiring the card issuer to prove express representations would ensure that
the card issuer never prevailed under § 523(a)(2)(A) except in "the most
remote circumstances and would immunize debtors from egregious and dis-
No one would argue that a credit card holder does not want the issuer to pay for his or
her purchase; that is the point of using the card. On what basis does the card holder
think the issuer will do this? Does the card holder think the issuer is making him or
her a gift? Of course not. Everyone involved in the process knows that a loan has just
been consummated, and the issuer would not have made the loan if the cardholder had
not promised to repay it.
Gibson, supra note 31, at 140.
49. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 405; Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs. (In re Rembert), 141
F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 1998); American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re
Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 1997); Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Kukuk (In re Kukuk), 225
B.R. 778 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 1998); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Searle (In re Searle), 223
B.R. 384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Wong (In re Wong), 207
B.R. 822 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); Akdogan, 204 B.R. at 98; MBNA Am. v. Parkhurst (In re
Parkhurst), 202 B.R. 816 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996).
50. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 406.
51. Id.; Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (9th Cir.
1996); Searle, 223 B.R. at 389; AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Dietzel (In re Dietzel), 245
B.R. 747, 753-54 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000).
52. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 406.
53. AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203 B.R. 360, 366-67 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1996).
54. Id.
55. 204 B.R. 90 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
56. Akdogan, 204 B.R. at 96 & n.4.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
honest conduct."57 Thus, to give creditors a chance, the court felt obliged to
accept the implied representation theory, in spite of the rather tenuous basis
for applying it to credit card transactions. 58
One court has implied a cardholder's representation based on a duty to
disclose that was triggered by the cardholder's conduct.59 In Citibank
(S.D.), NA v. Eashai (In re Eashai)60 the debtor engaged in what the court
labeled a "kiting scheme" in which he used over twenty-five different credit
cards to cover his living expenses and make the minimum monthly pay-
ments on the credit cards.61 The court held that when the conduct of the
debtor creates a facade that conceals his fraudulent intention, a duty to
disclose is triggered. 62 The failure of the debtor to disclose his intent not to
repay the charges he incurred with the cards was an omission, which under
the common law was equivalent to a representation. 63 Although a variation
on the implied representation doctrine, Eashai gives courts unwilling to im-
ply a representation based on the mere use of a credit card a way to justify
punishing the worst offenders without lessening the creditor's burden in the
ordinary § 523 cases. 64
A modified implied representation doctrine was applied in AT&T
Universal Card Services Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth).65 The
court recognized the legitimacy of the implied representation doctrine but
determined that it was past its prime-technology had solved the problem
of the missing representation. 66 The court found that with the advent of
electronic transmission of credit card transactions, "creditors are now
instantly aware when a debtor uses its card. Therefore debtors make an
express representation to the issuer each time they use the card that they
intend to repay the debt."67
Although this approach might solve the problem of the issuer's lack of
participation in the actual transaction, it is no less formalistic than the
implied representation doctrine with respect to the real issue. Just as use of
57. Id.
58. Id. at 96.
59. Citibank v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Universal
Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating "[w]hen one has
a duty to speak, both concealment and silence can constitute fraudulent misrepresentation").
60. 87 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1996).
61. Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1089-90.
62. Id. at 1089.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1086.
65. 212 BR. 326 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).
66. Ellingsworth, 212 B.R. at 334.
67. Id.
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the card in the non-electronic age would not communicate anything more
than the use of the card, the electronic pulse sent to the issuer's computer is
likewise without any substantive content, unless we imply that content.
This is exactly what the court in Ellingsworth did, even though it professed
to find an express representation of intent to pay.68 The only real difference
between the two transactions, non-electronic and electronic, is the timing of
the notice to the issuer that the cardholder has used the card. 69 The
electronic notice contains no more information than the non-electronic
message. 70 The distinction drawn by the court in Ellingsworth is one of
form, not substance.
Courts have read the Supreme Court's decision in Field v. Mans as
legitimizing the implied representation doctrine.7' Although Field was
neither a representation case nor a credit card case, it did require the Court
to identify an interpretive source for the undefined terms used in §
523(a)(2)(A); the Court picked the common law and pointed the lower
courts specifically to the Restatement of Torts.72 By looking to common
law, the Court's decision confirmed for the lower courts their pre-Field
application of the elements of common law fraud to credit card cases under
§ 523.73 The Court's adoption of the Restatement as an interpretive source
for § 523(a)(2)(A) allowed the lower courts to access a variety of standards
for application to credit card fraud under § 523.74 Since the Court's deci-
sion in Field, lower courts have utilized the Restatement's black letter law
and comments to justify implying a representation of intent to pay when the
holder uses a credit card.75 For example, courts are likely to note that under
the Restatement, misrepresentation denotes: "not only words spoken or
written but also any other conduct that amounts to an assertion not in
accordance with the truth. The words or conduct asserting the existence of
a fact constitute a misrepresentation if the fact does not exist." 76
In light of the Restatement, courts are able to find the implied repre-
sentation doctrine "consistent with the notion that a representation can be
made by words or conduct and recognizes representation as inherent in the
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 337.
71. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1995) (holding "that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires
justifiable, but not reasonable, reliance").
72. Id. at 69-72.
73. Id. at 69-70.
74. Id. at 70.
75. See, e.g., McCrory v. Spigel (In re Spigel), 260 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Field,
516 U.S. at 70-71 (using the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS)).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. b (1976).
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[credit card] transaction." 77 Thus, it becomes easy to attribute the necessary
expression of intent to the mere act of handing a credit card to a merchant.
The act becomes an assertion that "I'm giving you this card rather than
cash, so I can defer paying for the goods I'm purchasing from you." 78
Looking to the Restatement to justify the implied representation doc-
trine really produces rather mixed results. The Restatement clearly sanc-
tions implying the debtor's intention from the debtor's conduct. 79 Indeed,
to the extent that we characterize the credit card transaction as a contract or
an agreement between the cardholder and the card issuer, comment c to
section 530 tells us that "[t]he intention to perform the agreement may be
expressed but it is normally merely to be implied from the making of the
agreement." 80 Thus, if each use of the card is viewed as an affirmation of
the promise contained in the usual cardholder agreement to pay for charges
made, each use by the cardholder would represent his or her intent to
perform that promise. If the debtor lacked that intent, the representation
would be actionable under the Restatement: "Since a promise necessarily
carries with it the implied assertion of an intention to perform it follows that
a promise made without such an intention is fraudulent and actionable in
deceit under the rule stated in § 525."81
However, sections 525 and 530 are only two of the thirty-five sections
of the Restatement that address misrepresentation. 82 Other sections of the
Restatement are less supportive of the implied representation doctrine. For
example, section 547, entitled Recipient Relying on His Own Investigation,
provides in part:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the maker of a fraudulent
misrepresentation is not liable to another whose decision to engage
in the transaction that the representation was intended to induce is
not caused by his belief in the truth of the representation but is the
result of an independent investigation made by him.83
A creditor that stakes its claim of justifiable reliance on the
thoroughness of its pre-issuance investigation of the debtor may find it
77. AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Searle (In re Searle), 223 B.R. 384, 389 (Bankr.
D. Ma. 1998).
78. Id. at 390.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. b.
80. Id. § 530.
81. Id. § 530 cmt. c.
82. Id. §§ 525-552C.
83. Id. § 547(1). Subsection (2) does not change the analysis that follows, as it only provides
that "[tlhe fact that the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is relying upon his own investi-
gation does not relieve the maker from liability if he by false statements or otherwise intentionally
prevents the investigation from being effective." Id. § 547(2).
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difficult to overcome the presumption described in comment a to subsection
(1) of section 547, that it did not then rely on the representation implied by
the use of the card: "Ordinarily one who makes an investigation will be
taken to rely on it alone as to all facts disclosed to him and all facts that
must have been obvious to him in the course of it."84 This raises the
question of whether a creditor's implied reliance on the implied intent to
repay will ever be justifiable under the Restatement, when based on a pre-
issuance investigation of the credit-worthiness of the cardholder. Comment
a to section 547 suggests that to the extent the creditor in fact relied on the
implied representation, the reliance would not be justifiable.85 Surely it
would be even more unjustifiable where the reliance itself must be implied.
Section 530 of the Restatement itself might be construed against the
creditor's interest in the implied representation context. 86 Section 530
sanctions imply a representation from conduct. However, it also notes in
comment b that, as long as the debtor honestly intended to repay the charge
at the time we imply the representation, the fact that the debtor "for any
reason changes his mind and fails or refuses to carry out his expressed
intention" does not establish a claim for misrepresentation.87 To the extent
that the debtor changes his mind, the card issuer may have a claim for
breach of contract, but such claims are not made non-dischargeable under §
523(a)(2)(A).88 This should be troubling for creditors because many of the
factors the courts rely on to establish the debtor's implied intent at the time
of card use can easily be discounted as simply evidence that the debtor
changed his mind after the fact.89
The Restatement does not provide the uncontrovertible legitimization
of the implied representation doctrine that many courts have presumed after
the Supreme Court's decision in Field.90 In a number of ways, the
Restatement presents additional problems for creditors relying on the
84. Id. § 547 cmt. a. Whether the creditor's reliance on the implied representation will be
enough to overcome the presumption will be "a question of fact for the jury to determine, unless
the evidence clearly indicates only one conclusion." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 530.
87. Id. § 530 cmt. b.
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring "false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud" by debtor to make creditor's claim non-dischargeable).
89. Among the factors cited in the cases are (1) the time between card-use and bankruptcy,
(2) the number of charges, (3) the amount of the charges, (4) the debtor's financial condition at
card-use, (5) whether multiple charges were made on the same day, (6) whether the debtor was
employed, (7) the debtor's financial sophistication, and (8) whether the charges were for luxuries
or necessities. AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 408 (5th Cir.
2001).
90. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 77 (1999) (holding § 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable
reliance by creditor on the debtor's representations).
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implied representations of the debtor as part of their claims that credit card
debt is non-dischargeable. However, such problems seem inevitable with a
doctrine that must pile fiction upon fiction in order to produce results.
B. ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE
The assumption of risk doctrine shifts the § 523 focus to the conduct of
the card issuer; it evaluates, in effect, the reasonableness of the issuer's
decision to empower the debtor to use a credit card or to continue using the
card after circumstances arise that suggest the debtor is abusing- card
privileges or that default is imminent. 9' Courts adopting the assumption of
risk doctrine usually are very critical of the credit assessment and card
issuance policies of the issuer and generally unsympathetic to the claims of
cardholder abuse raised by the issuer. 92 These courts generally believe that
the card issuer is equally, if not more, responsible than the debtor for the
debtor's predicament. 93 This is especially true where the card was issued
on a "pre-approved" basis with only the most minimal credit assessment
made of the cardholder before issuing the card.94 In these situations, the
card issuer has seldom obtained any truly particularized information about
91. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1983); First USA
Bank v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 210 B.R. 212 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); FCC Nat'l Bank v. Etto (In
re Etto), 210 B.R. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Carpenter (In re
Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985).
92. Etto, 210 B.R. at 740; Hunter, 210 B.R. at 216; Mercer, 246 F.3d at 427 (Duhe, J.,
dissenting) ("Now AT&T asks this Court to fashion a fiction to save it from the consequences of
its own inadequate credit check, and, to my surprise, this Court has done so."); Carpenter, 53 B.R.
at 728-29 ("As long as credit card companies insist on sending out pre-printed 'invitations' to
apply for their credit card with the credit limits already appearing on the 'invitation,' the Court
will assume that the company has voluntarily undertaken the risk of nonpayment.").
93. See Carpenter, 53 B.R. at 727-28 (stating card issuer is presumed to extend credit to
cardholder until it revokes such extension of credit and communicates that revocation to
cardholder).
94. See Etto, 210 B.R. at 740 (concluding that when debtor received unsolicited pre-
approved credit card, the creditor "had little concern as to Defendant's ability or intent to repay
debts and, therefore, accepted the risk of non-payment"); see also Hunter, 210 B.R. at 216 ("[Njot
only did the Plaintiff not revoke the Defendant's credit card, the Plaintiff offered to upgrade his
card to platinum status at the same time it was suing him! The Defendant did not solicit this
offer.... The Defendant simply cannot be a good credit risk one week before trial and culpable
of fraud a week later."). Other courts have imported an assumption of risk analysis into the reli-
ance requirement that the courts have read into § 523(a)(2)(A). See Mercantile Bank v. Hiemer
(In re Hiemer), 184 B.R. 345, 349 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995) ("Despite the debtor's extensive credit
card debt on his seventeen other credit cards, Mercantile Bank solicited the debtor with a pre-
approved credit limit of $2,000.00 and approved the debtor after a preliminary credit check."); see
also Chase v. Pressgrove (In re Pressgrove), 147 B.R. 244, 247 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) ("[Pllaintiff
chose to offer Paul Pressgrove, an inveterate gambler, and his wife a pre-approved $6,000 line of
credit .... Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to serve as a haven for dishonest debt-
ors .... The Court believes Congress also showed little desire to protect foolhardy creditors.");
AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 337 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997) (noting that debtor had obtained four new credit cards since filing bankruptcy).
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the debtor's financial condition or general ability to pay. 95 Instead, to
determine credit-worthiness, the issuer has employed some mathematical
formula designed to predict the probability of default based on the past
experiences of other creditors with this debtor.96 The courts adopting the
assumption of risk doctrine are seemingly unwilling to equate probability of
default with credit-worthiness, especially when the issuer has not made any
effort to test the accuracy of the probability assessment against actual, up-
to-date information obtained from the debtor.97 Understandably, these
courts are reluctant to find that the issuer's reliance on any representation
made by or imputed to the debtor was justifiable, much less reasonable.98
Thus, the assumption of risk doctrine is essentially concerned with the
reliance element of the fraud claim. 99 The courts applying this doctrine do
not concern themselves with the theoretical or practical differences between
the grounds for excepting a debt from discharge set out in § 523 and
generally accept the proposition that § 523 is all about fraud; they adopt for
purposes of applying § 523 the basic elements that the courts have
attributed to common law fraud.100 The critical analysis under the assump-
tion of risk doctrine goes to the reliance element and focuses specifically on
how the card issuer reached its decision to issue the card to this debtor. 101
95. See, e.g., Ellingsworth, 212 B.R. at 328 (stating Ms. Ellingsworth had only to call card
issuer and verify her income and employment to activate pre-approved credit card).
96. See Snow, supra note 36, at 86-87. As Justice Snow explains it:
Credit bureaus and various third parties have developed sophisticated mathematical
models, referred to generally as "credit scores" or "risk scores," to quantify consumer
payment behavior. A "risk score" is a "statistical summary of the information
described in words and figures in the credit report." Led by Fair, Issac and Company,
the pioneer of credit scoring, the credit card industry has employed models to evaluate
profit potential and delinquency risk based on assigning numerical values to
information contained in the consumers' credit reports.
Id. (quoting Experian, available at www.experian.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2002) (citations
omitted)).
97. Etto, 210 B.R. at 740; Hunter, 210 B.R. at 216. This concern has also been recognized
by courts applying the implied representation theory in connection with the reliance requirement
that the courts have read into § 523(a)(2). See Universal Bank, NA v. Grause (In re Grause), 245
B.R. 95, 102 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000) ("Universal not only should have been aware of Ms. Grause's
dire financial condition, the evidence shows that Universal was in fact aware of her financial
troubles, particularly the activity which Universal asserts evidences Ms. Grause's intent to defraud
it."); Hiemer, 184 B.R. at 349; Pressgrove, 147 B.R. at 247.
98. Etto, 210 B.R. at 740; Hunter, 210 B.R. at 216; AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer
(In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 427 (5th Cir. 2001) (Duhe, J., dissenting).
99. See Mercer, 246 F.3d at 421 (stating assumption of risk occurs when reliance is
unjustified).
100. Etto, 210 B.R. at 740; Hunter, 210 B.R. at 216; Mercer, 246 F.3d at 427 (Duhe, J.,
dissenting).
101. See Mercer, 246 F.3d at 411 (focusing on card issuer's screening process).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Early cases applying this doctrine were not so much concerned with
whether the debtor had actually made representations and did not neces-
sarily expressly analyze the problem in terms of reliance.102 For § 523
analysis, the obvious implication to draw from the refusal to find a debt
excepted from discharge based on fraud because of the unreasonableness of
the issuer's decision to give the debtor a credit card, was that it would have
been unreasonable for the card issuer to have relied on any debtor state-
ment; therefore, an essential element of the creditor's cause of action could
not be proven. 0 3 After the Supreme Court's decision in Field, the assump-
tion of risk doctrine, when employed, has essentially been incorporated into
the analysis of reliance under whatever concept of fraud the court has
adopted. 104
Indeed, after Field, the assumption of risk doctrine has been somewhat
refined based on Justice Souter's majority opinion.105 Although Field
rejected "reasonableness" as the test for reliance under § 523 and adopted a
"justifiable reliance" standard, Justice Souter made clear that the
"reasonableness" of the creditor's conduct was not irrelevant:
As for the reasonableness of reliance, our reading of the Act does
not leave reasonableness irrelevant, for the greater the distance
between the reliance claimed and the limits of the reasonable, the
greater the doubt about reliance in fact. Naifs may recover, at
common law and in bankruptcy, but lots of creditors are not at all
naive. The subjectiveness of justifiability cuts both ways, and
reasonableness goes to the probability of actual reliance. 106
Based on this part of the Supreme Court's opinion in Field, Judge
Dennis of the Fifth Circuit concluded that where a creditor issued a card
based on a pre-screening formula that relied upon a credit history of the
debtor's ability to make minimum monthly payments on other credit cards,
the creditor could not establish reliance because it had assumed "the risk of
102. See First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927, 930-32 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(inquiring whether purchases and cash advances "were obtained by false pretenses or false
representations within the meaning of the statute").
103. Etto, 210 B.R. at 740; Hunter, 210 B.R. at 216; Mercer, 246 F.3d at 427 (Duhe, J.,
dissenting).
104. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995); Universal Bank v. Grause (In re Grause), 245 B.R.
95, 102 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Akdogan (In re Akdogan),
204 B.R. 90, 96-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re
Feld), 203 B.R. 360, 369 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re
Briese), 196 B.R. 440,454 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996).
105. Field, 516 U.S. at 77. The refinement also probably reflects to some extent the
incorporation of this doctrine into the reliance element of the fraud analysis.
106. Id. at 76.
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issuing pre-approved credit cards on such meager information."107 Judge
Duhe, in the same case, was even more blunt; he explained that, at least in
the pre-approved credit card context, once the issuer makes the "primary"
decision to extend credit, the issuer "assumes the risk of any future lending
by the debtor."108 Thus, the assumption of risk doctrine, although now
easily incorporated into whatever doctrine that accepts the basic elements of
common law fraud for § 523 purposes, still has its supporters.
The assumption of risk doctrine does not always guarantee a debtor
victory in a § 523 proceeding.109 A number of courts that have used the
assumption of risk doctrine to negate justifiable reliance where the creditor
has performed an insufficient credit assessment before issuing the card have
recognized that the creditor's post-issuance experience with the debtor can
effect a reallocation of risk.ll0 In these cases the creditor's initial assump-
tion of the risk does not necessarily extend through the entire relationship
between the issuer and the cardholder."'1 This transformation can be based
on a variety of circumstances. For example, where the cardholder uses the
card for some period of time and timely, or at least regularly, makes the re-
quired payments, the issuer may no longer be found to assume the risk of
non-payment for subsequent uses of the card."l 2 Another example would be
where a creditor monitors the credit rating of the account over a period of
time, and during the period, the cardholder's rating remains acceptable."13
Thus, a creditor's initial assumption of risk based on an inadequate credit-
worthiness assessment can be alleviated when the creditor guesses correctly
and the debtor lives up to his end of the bargain for at least a while after
receiving the card. 114
107. Mercer, 211 F.3d at 220 (Dennis, J., concurring), rev'd en banc, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir.
2001); AT&T v. Herrig (In re Herrig), 217 B.R. 891, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998); AT&T
Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ellingsworth (In re Ellingsworth), 212 B.R. 326, 338-39 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
108. Mercer, 211 F.3d at 217, rev'd en banc, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001).
109. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating creditor may assume risks like debtor's mistake, but the court declined to
apply assumption of risk to debtor's knowing and intentional use of the credit card with no
intention to pay for the charges).
110. Mercer, 211 F.3d at 220 (Dennis, J., concurring), rev'd en banc, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir.
2001); Herrig, 217 B.R. at 900; Colonial National Bank v. Carrier (In re Carrier), 181 B.R. 742,
749 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
111. Mercer, 211 F.3d at 220 (Dennis, J., concurring), rev'd en banc, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir.
2001); Herrig, 217 B.R. at 900; Carrier, 181 B.R. at 749.
112. American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d
1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996).
113. Herrig, 217 B.R. at 899.
114. Id. at 900.
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
C. THE NO REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE
A number of courts have refused to buy the fiction employed in the
other doctrines that the debtor impliedly represents something to the card
issuer with each use of the card.] 5 The reasons articulated by these courts
for refusing to imply that the debtor makes a representation with his use of
the card, which can be grounds for excluding credit card debt from
discharge, vary. Underlying the reasons expressed in each case is a strong
sense that implying a representation makes it too easy for the creditor to
win a § 523 proceeding and that this is contrary to the long-established rule
of narrowly construing exceptions to discharge." 6 For example, the court
in GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox),ll7 was troubled by the fact that under the
implied representation doctrine the fraudulent intent that made the card-
holder's implied representation that he intended to pay the card issuer for
the credit it extended when he used his credit card was almost always based
on circumstantial evidence that went to the cardholder's ability to pay.118
Because exceptions to discharge based on the debtor's financial condition
are expressly excluded from § 523(a)(2)(B), inferring that the cardholder's
implied representation that he intended to pay was made fraudulently
because his balance sheet suggested the absence of any realistic capacity to
repay the credit, circumvented the statutory command that representations
about financial condition were only grounds for denying discharge if made
in writing.19 Indeed, the "symbiotic relationship" between intent to pay
and ability to pay often resulted in a determination of non-dischargeability
based on the debtor's "history of financial difficulties" rather than on
whether the debtor was honest and deserving of a fresh start. 120
115. Universal Bank, NA v. Rich (In re Rich), 249 B.R. 709, 716 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000);
Universal Bank, NA v. Kuntz (In re Kuntz), 249 B.R. 699, 705 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000); AT&T
Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 732 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1996); GM
Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 634-36 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995); Norwest Bank, NA v.
Omdorff (In re Omdorff), 162 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1994); Mercer, 246 F.3d at 427-
28 (Duhe, J., dissenting).
116. Alvi, 191 B.R. at 732 & n.15; see also Rich, 249 B.R. at 716 ("Courts should not create
a fictional representation flowing from use of the credit card to enable credit card companies to
pursue debtors who otherwise made no express misrepresentations to them."); Kuntz, 249 B.R. at
705.
117. 182 B.R. 626 (Bankr. D. Mass 1995).
118. See Cox, 182 B.R. at 633-34 ("Moreover, a debtor's lack of intent to pay is usually
inferred primarily from his lack of financial ability. The symbiotic relationship between intent
and ability is borne out by the many decisions exempting debt from discharge because of
misrepresentation of both intent and ability.").
119. Id. at 634.
120. Id. at 629-30 ("[A] finding by the fact finder that the debtor lacks intent to pay is
typically based primarily upon the debtor's lack of ability to pay.").
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In AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Alvi,121 Judge Robert E.
Ginsburg attacked the implied representation doctrine from a different
angle. Relying on the Supreme Court's determination that a person who
writes a bad check does not make an implied representation that there are
funds in the account to cover the check, Judge Ginsburg concluded that the
use of a credit card in the typical credit card transaction was not a
representation, express or implied, of anything.122 In Williams v. United
States,123 the Supreme Court had explained that since a check is not a
factual assertion, it could not be "characterized as 'true' or 'false." ' 124
According to Judge Ginsburg in Alvi:
The similarities between the issuance of a check and the use of a
credit card are sufficient to make it illogical to conclude that the use
of a credit card in an ordinary credit transaction necessarily
involves a representation, when the issuance of a bad check does
not, per se, involve a representation. Just as the Supreme Court has
held a check is not capable of being true or false, using a credit card
to incur debt in and of itself is not capable of being true or false.125
Therefore, he rejected the implied representation doctrine and held that
in a credit transaction, the use of a credit card "is not, per se, a represen-
tation."1 26 Judge Ginsburg is careful to point out what he has not con-
cluded: that the use of a credit card can never give rise to a representation
that could be grounds for excepting a debt from discharge under § 523.127
For example, when a cardholder, who knows that he has exceeded the credit
limit on his account, convinces a vendor whose card verification system is
not functioning to accept his card anyway because his credit "is good," the
cardholder has made a misrepresentation about his authority to use the card;
in a subsequent bankruptcy of the cardholder, this would constitute a
representation under § 523.128 Thus, the use of a credit card alone is not
enough to create the representation necessary to show fraud under § 523,
121. 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1996).
122. Alvi, 191 B.R. at 731-32; Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 283-84 (1982).
123. 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
124. Williams, 458 U.S. at 284.
125. Alvi, 191 B.R. at 732.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 732 n.14.
128. Id. Of course, there would still be the issue of reliance by the card issuer---can the card
issuer be considered to have relied on a representation made only to induce the store clerk to
accept the card.
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but use plus some express statement might convert the debt incurred to one
obtained by fraud. 129
More recently, the court in Universal Bank, NA v. Rich (In re Rich),130
and Universal Bank, NA v. Kuntz (In re Kuntz), 131 held that a cardholder
does not make any representation to the card issuer when he uses the
card.132 Relying on Judge Ginsburg's analogy of credit card transactions to
checks, the court explained that it was "illogical" to imply a representation
of intent to repay based on use of the card, explaining:
The courts adopting the implied representation theory are creating a
fictional representation because the cardholder's breach of contract
when he fails to pay his credit card debt is insufficient as a matter
of law to support a nondischargeability complaint. If Congress
intended to make breach of contract a basis for a nondischarge-
ability complaint, the Code should be amended to so provide. 133
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE
Courts, convinced that it is improper to allow debtors who have run up
large credit card balances to simply file bankruptcy and walk away from
their debts, have attributed the traditional common law meaning to the term
"fraud" as used in § 523, a meaning that was developed outside the context
of bankruptcy. 134 As a result, these courts have imported into § 523 a
specific form of action with all of its traditional rules and anthems.135 This
has the distinct advantage of providing a recognized conceptual framework
129. Id. at 733. Presumably only the charge related to the representation would be excepted
from discharge, not the entire balance owing to the card issuer at the time of bankruptcy.
130. 249 B.R. 709 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
131. 249 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
132. Universal Bank, NA v. Rich (In re Rich), 249 B.R. 709, 719 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000);
Universal Bank, NA v. Kuntz (In re Kuntz), 249 B.R. 699, 704 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
133. Rich, 249 B.R. at 716; Kuntz, 249 B.R. at 706. Justice Houser, in Rich, chastised courts
for using the implied representation theory: "Courts should not create a fictional representation
flowing from use of the credit card to enable credit card companies to pursue debtors who other-
wise made no express representations to them." Rich, 249 B.R. at 716; see also Kuntz, 249 B.R. at
706; AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 211 F.3d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 2000),
rev'd en banc, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to find an implied representation in the pre-
approved card context). It is not clear why the propriety of applying the implied representation
doctrine should turn on whether the debtor uses a pre-approved card, since even in the pre-
approved card context, the cardholder use would follow receipt of the card and the cardholder
agreement. Perhaps Justice Duhe, who wrote the opinion, was being careful to make clear that his
views applied only to the specific facts of the case before him.
134. See Mercer, 246 F.3d at 402-03 (looking to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and
its definition of fraudulent misrepresentation).
135. Id.
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into which the courts can plug the credit card problem. 136 Even though the
fit is less than perfect, the imperfection is masked by the apparent legiti-
macy of the underlying conceptual basis, the necessary assumptions-
analytical leaps to some-are less bothersome.137 Credit card use is easily
transformed into fraud when the debtor subsequently files bankruptcy and
seeks to discharge credit card debt. 138
Fraud has not developed such a specific meaning in the context of
American bankruptcy law. 139 Instead, the term fraud has consistently been
used as a synonym for dishonesty, an assessment of the debtor's character
in light of what we might call the bankruptcy bargain: in exchange for
surrendering his or her property and cooperating with creditors, the debtor
is discharged from his or her debts.140 In this context, fraud means debtor
conduct that impedes the bankruptcy process, which harms the system in
general.141 Fraud is not an independent cause of action that can be invoked
to protect creditor-specific complaints about the debtor. 42 Thus, to read
fraud as creating an independent basis for objecting to the debtor's
discharge, in § 523, is inconsistent with the traditional use of that term in
American bankruptcy law. 143 If fraud does not mean common law fraud,
the fictions adopted by the courts to fit credit card debts into the common
law cause of action for fraud will no longer help creditors establish the
nondischargeability of credit card debt under § 523.
A. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1800
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (1800 Act) 144 was the kind of bankruptcy
legislation that would later come to be characterized as "collection law"
because it could only be invoked by petition of the debtor's creditors.145
136. Id. at 403.
137. See id. (showing creditor needed to prove the five elements of fraud to defeat debtor's
attempt to discharge credit card debt).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 402-07 (discussing the three operatives of § 523(a)(2)(A): false pretenses,
false misrepresentation, and actual fraud).
140. See id. at 407 n.17 ("Congress made clear its intent to limit the 'fresh start' to honest,
but unfortunate, debtors, not perpetrators of fraud.").
141. Id.
142. Id. at 403-04.
143. See id. (discussing early bankruptcy law).
144. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1803, ch. 6, 2
Stat. 248.
145. 30 CONG. REC. S628 (1897) (statement of Sen. Stewart); see also id. at S663, 670
(statements of Sen. Nelson). Section 2 provided that the proceeding could be initiated upon
petition by a single creditor with a claim of at least $1000 or two creditors with claims of at least
$1500, or by more than two creditors with claims of at least $2000. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch.
19, § 2, 2 Stat. 19, 21.
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Debtors could not partake of the debt relief afforded by the 1800 Act by
submitting themselves to the bankruptcy process.I46 Thus, no matter how
destitute the debtor or hopeless the debtor's financial condition, only those
debtors with creditors who saw the Act as serving their own purposes were
likely to find themselves in a position to benefit from the 1800 Act.147
Another shortcoming of the 1800 Act was that it was only available to
"merchants," persons "actually using the trade of merchandise, by buying
and selling in gross, or by retail, or dealing in exchange," and bankers,
brokers, factors, underwriters, or marine insurers.14 8  The petitioning
creditors also had to establish that their debtor had, within six months of the
filing of the petition, committed an act of bankruptcy. 149 Acts of bank-
ruptcy involved situations in which the debtor was imprisoned for failure to
pay his debts, where his property had been seized by a creditor on account
of debt, or where the debtor had attempted to avoid paying his debts by
running away, concealing property, or transferring property to place it out
of the reach of his creditors.1S0 Thus, only those persons engaged in some
form of business were eligible for debt relief under the 1800 Act, and then
only if they had been jailed, had lost their property to creditors, or had tried
to cheat their creditors, and their creditors were willing to initiate the
proceeding. 151
As enacted, the 1800 Act also had a short life expectancy. It was to be
effective for only five years, but after being attacked unrelentingly by
nearly every interested group, Congress repealed it after only three years.152
Criticisms of the 1800 Act were many, but especially prominent were those
of the debtors not eligible for relief, many of whom were greatly harmed by
the discharge of their debtors but denied access to the relief they needed
because of the Act. 153 Moreover, the Act was generally seen as permitting
dishonest debtors to escape the consequences of their fraud; some even
asserted that the Act itself was a tool that dishonest persons could use to
commit fraud. 154  And the minimal dividends paid to creditors in
146. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 2, 2 Stat. at 21.
147. Crafty debtors were able to get themselves into bankruptcy by convincing a "friendly"
creditor to initiate the proceeding. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES 20
(1935).
148. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. at 19-20.
149. Id. 2 Stat. at 20.
150. Id. 2 Stat. at 21.
151. Id.
152. See Bankruptcy Act of 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (repealing the Bankruptcy Act of 1800).
153. WARREN, supra note 147, at 20-21.
154. Id. at 20. "'We saw rich men today, bankrupt tomorrow, and the next day in full
business and great style, while the poor farmer or manufacturer who had been ruined by their
extravagance must suffer the penalties of the law in a jail."' Id.
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proceedings under the Act hardly justified the expense and inconvenience
of a proceeding, much less allowing the debtor to be released from his
obligations.155
Although the 1800 Act provided conditions for the debtor's discharge,
it did not except specific debts other than debts owing to states or to the
federal government from discharge.156 A debtor was entitled to a "certifi-
cate of discharge" if (1) the commissioners assigned to his case certified to
the court that he had complied with all of the requirements imposed on
debtors by the act, including the identification of all of his assets, (2) two-
thirds of his creditors in number and amount with claims of at least $50
each signed the certificate of discharge consenting to the discharge, (3) the
debtor certified under oath that the consent of the creditors was obtained
"fairly and without fraud," and, apparently, (4) the court was not persuaded
by any creditors appearing when the certificate was presented to the judge
that the debtor had not met the first three conditions for a discharge.157
Section 37 of the Act further provided that a debtor who conspired with a
creditor to present a false or fictitious claim with the intent to defraud his
other creditors or, who, after passage of the Act or within the year
proceeding the bankruptcy case, lost a total of $300, or more than $50 at
one time, gambling lost his right to the certificate of discharge.158 The
debtor would also lose his discharge if he was convicted of a "willful
default or omission" of his obligations to turn over property, submit to
examination by his creditors, and otherwise cooperate with the
commissioners in their administration of his estate.159 The certificate lost
its effect as evidence of discharge in a subsequent proceeding against the
debtor to enforce a discharged debt if the creditor proved that the certificate
was obtained "unfairly and by fraud," or if the creditor could produce
evidence that the debtor had concealed property worth at least $100 from
his creditors. 160
The 1800 Act was bitterly contested despite the impending financial
crisis, caused in part by the rush to speculative real estate ventures in the
mid-1790s and exacerbated in 1799 after America's relationship with
France soured, which resulted in a significant disruption of commercial
155. Id. at 19.
156. Section 34 provided that the debtor "shall be discharged from all debts by him or her
due or owing, at the time he or she became bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 34, 2
Stat. 19, 30-31. Section 62 excepted from discharge debts "due to the United States or to any of
them." Id. § 62, 2 Stat. at 36.
157. Id. § 36, 2 Stat. at 31.
158. Id. § 37, 2 Stat. at 31-32.
159. Id. § 18, 2 Stat. at 26-27.
160. Id. § 34, 2 Stat. at 30-31.
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activity.161 The Act barely passed Congress; the House approved it by a
vote of forty-nine to forty-eight, and it passed the Senate by a vote of
sixteen to twelve.162 One of the major points of contention evolved around
debtor fraud. Supporters of bankruptcy legislation argued that debtor fraud
created the need for a bankruptcy law to protect the interests of credi-
tors-to provide them with the opportunity to prevent fraud.163 Opponents
argued that such a law would not only reward fraudulent debtors, but en-
courage fraud.164 Despite this concern with debtor fraud, the 1800 Act did
not expressly except debts based on pre-bankruptcy acts of fraud from
discharge, or make such conduct a basis for depriving the debtor of his
discharge.165 Indeed, such acts were grounds for placing the debtor into
bankruptcy, but the debtor's discharge was not conditioned on pre-bank-
ruptcy conduct.166 The exception to discharge based on pre-bankruptcy
gambling losses seemed to incorporate a moral condemnation of the
conduct rather than a judgment of the debtor's honesty.167
Fraud, as used in the 1800 Act, seems to connotate a general category
of dishonesty rather than a specific form of action. 168 For example, a debtor
who is convicted for willfully failing to fulfill his responsibilities under the
Act, such as for failing to turn over non-exempt property or records of as-
sets or for failing to identify other assets or anticipated benefits, is deemed a
"fraudulent bankrupt," may be imprisoned for up to a year, and shall not
"be entitled to the benefits of this act." 169 Presumably, one of the denied
benefits is the discharge since the commissioners would not be able to
certify that he had complied with the Act, and thus one of the conditions to
discharge could not be established.170 Similarly, the debtor could lose his
discharge if he participated in the assertion of a "fictitious or false debt"
against the estate, also a wrong committed after the case had been filed.171
Further, the discharge could, in effect, be revoked if obtained "unfairly, and
by fraud."172
161. WARREN, supra note 147, at 15-19.
162. Id. at 19.
163. Id. at 15-19.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 20.
166. Id. at 19-20.
167. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 37, 2 Stat. 19, 31-32.
168. Id.
169. Id. § 18, 2 Stat. at 26-27.
170. Id. § 36, 2 Stat. at 31.
171. Id. § 37, 2 Stat. at 31-32.
172. Id. § 34, 2 Stat. at 30-31.
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Thus the term fraud, to the extent it related to the debtor's discharge,
involved the debtor's conduct after the case was filed and was based on an
assessment of his cooperation after the case was filed.173 Of course, to a
certain extent, this makes sense as long as the creditors control the initiation
of the process. Creditor control, in theory, prevented the debtor from
wronging his creditors and then taking refuge under a bankruptcy law that
granted absolution by discharging him from the consequences of his
wrongful conduct. 174 Under the 1800 Act, the debtor's access to refuge was
in the hands of the creditors he had wronged. 175
Unfortunately, creditor control was not the perfect guaranty against
wrongful pre-bankruptcy conduct being rewarded with a discharge because
a wronged creditor could not prevent the debtor from being placed in bank-
ruptcy-any of the debtor's creditors holding the necessary amount of
claims could by petition initiate a proceeding.176 Indeed, one of the prin-
ciple arguments for the early repeal of the 1800 Act was that undeserving
and dishonest debtors could conspire with friendly creditors and get into
bankruptcy where, as long as they played along, debtors would ultimately
receive their discharges, to the great detriment of their general creditors.177
This seems to overstate the problem in light of the condition on discharge
that two-thirds of the debtor's creditors consent to his discharge, but it was
one of the lasting legacies of the 1800 Act.178
B. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841
The bankruptcy bill passed by Congress in 1841 (1841 Act) reflected a
significant change in the country's view of debtor relief.179 Whereas the
1800 Act had functioned more or less as a debt collection vehicle, the 1841
Act was nothing less than the proverbial season of jubilee.180 Although in
the end it was effective for just over a year, more than thirty thousand
173. Id.
174. Id. § 37, 2 Stat. at 31-32.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 2, 2 Stat. at 21-22.
177. WARREN, supra note 147, at 19-2 1.
178. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 36, 2 Stat. 19, 31.
179. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1843, ch. 82,
5 Stat. 614.
180. Leviticus 25. Rep. Trumball of Connecticut compared the 1841 Act with the 1800 Act,
stating: "Under this bill, discharge of debtor is the thing principally aimed at. Under previous
acts, surrender of property was the chief object." WARREN, supra note 147, at 73.
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debtors obtained relief under the Act.181 The most important, and perhaps
the most controversial, feature of this Act was that access to relief under the
Act was no longer solely in control of a debtor's creditors.182 The Act
provided for voluntary submission of debtors to the bankruptcy process,
which meant that debtors could initiate their own bankruptcy proceed-
ings.183 Additionally, because eligibility for relief was no longer limited to
just merchants and traders, the 1841 Act opened up debt relief to a
substantial portion of the population.184 The Act did provide that involun-
tary proceedings could be initiated against merchants, traders, and the like,
who had committed any of the "acts of bankruptcy" set out in the Act, but
involuntary debtors who elected to resist the petition were entitled to a jury
trial on the allegations on which the petition was based.185 Although credi-
tor consent was still required to obtain a discharge, the debtor no longer had
the burden of affirmatively obtaining that consent; rather, a majority of the
debtor's creditors were required to actually contest the discharge by formal
filing with the court. 186
Like the 1800 Act, the 1841 Act conditioned the debtor's right to a
discharge on compliance with the requirements of the Act, including the
surrender of all of the debtor's property, as well as compliance with any
orders or directives issued by the court.1 87 Unlike the 1800 Act, there was
no requirement that the debtor obtain the consent of his creditors to the dis-
charge.188 Instead, the debtor petitioned the court for his certificate of
discharge, and the court held a hearing on the petition, after notice to
creditors.189
To prevent the debtor's discharge, creditors representing a majority in
number and amount were required to file a written dissent and were given
the opportunity to appear at the discharge hearing and present their case
against discharge.190 Discharge was denied where the debtor (1) was guilty
181. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 325, 353 (1991). The 1841 Act became effective February 1, 1842, and was
repealed on March 3, 1843, by the Bankruptcy Act of 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
182. Tabb, supra note 181, at 352-53.
183. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 440-42.
184. Id. § 1, 5 Stat. at 441. Under this Act, all persons owing debts that were not based on
acts of defalcation as a public officer or breach of fiduciary duties were eligible to petition for
relief. Id. § 1, 5 Stat. at 440-42.
185. Id. § 1,5 Stat. at442.
186. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44. The required majority was in number and amount. Id. § 4, 5
Stat. at 444.
187. Id. § 4,5 Stat. at 443.
188. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44.
189. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443.
190. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44.
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of "any fraud or wilful concealment of his property," (2) had preferred any
of his creditors, (3) had refused to comply with an order of the court or
otherwise comply with the requirements of the Act, (4) had admitted "false
or fictitious" debts, or (5) had, after the passage of the 1841 Act, applied
trust funds to his own use. 191 In the case of a preference that was made
after January 1, 1841, "in contemplation of the passage of a bankrupt law,"
the debtor could save his discharge if a "majority in interest" of his
creditors that had not been preferred consented to the discharge. 192
Although the 1841 Act did not provide a specific procedure for indi-
vidual creditors to object to the discharge of their debts, it effectively
excepted from discharge in voluntary proceedings, debts "created in conse-
quence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as an executor, administrator,
guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity," by ex-
cluding from eligibility anyone owing such debts.19 3 The Act did not
expressly exclude from discharge debts owing to the United States or the
individual states, but courts subsequently read such an exception into the
Act. 194
As might be expected, open access to bankruptcy came with an ex-
panded category of grounds for denying the debtor his discharge.195 In
theory, once bankruptcy is available on debtor demand, creditors would be
even more concerned with the pre-bankruptcy conduct of the debtor and
whether the debtor could escape the consequences of wrongful conduct by
filing for bankruptcy. 196 But absent a fiduciary relationship, only one of the
grounds for denying the debtor a discharge under the 1841 Act was based
on pre-bankruptcy conduct, that of preferring a creditor, which under the
1800 Act was an act of bankruptcy. 197 A majority in interest of those
creditors not preferred could also effectively waive this basis for denying
discharge, if a creditor raised the issue before the discharge hearing.198 A
debtor who applied trust funds "to his own use" was also to be denied a
discharge, but only if that misappropriation occurred after the Act was
passed.199 This was really the first bankruptcy provision to punish the
debtor for conduct that would generally be considered wrongful outside of
191. Id. §4,5 Stat. at444.
192. Id. § 2, 5 Stat. at 442.
193. Id. § 1, 5 Stat. at 440-42.
194. IA Collier on Bankr. (J. Moore) § 17.13, 1611 & n.I 1 (14th ed. 1978).
195. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443-44.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. § 2, 5 Stat. at 442.
199. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44.
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the bankruptcy context. 200 Although preferring certain creditors over others
might be considered unfair, it was not subject to the same approbation of
immorality to which a breach of fiduciary duty was subject.201 But, perhaps
more to the point, breach of fiduciary duty would not usually be based on a
debtor-creditor relationship, and thus this ground for denying discharge is
not really punishment for a pre-bankruptcy wrong done to a creditor.202
The other grounds for denying the debtor's discharge were based on
post-petition conduct: Wilfully failing to comply with the requirements of
the Act or with court orders issued in the case; acquiescing in the admission
of a fictitious or false claim against the estate; or a finding that the debtor
"shall be guilty of any fraud or wilful concealment of his property." 203
Although the last ground could be construed to include pre-bankruptcy
conduct, when considered in light of the rest of the act, it seems limited to
conduct that occurred in connection with the case itself.204 First, even if the
concealment occurred pre-bankruptcy, only the continued concealment of
that property during the case would be relevant to the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. 205 The debtor would have an opportunity to make amends once
the case was filed and turn over the concealed property, along with the rest
of the property he was required to surrender.206 Thus, fraud as used in this
context would seem to be a fraud on the bankruptcy process, rather than a
fraud perpetrated on a particular creditor.2 07 Second, section 4 makes this
same fraud and wilful concealment grounds for, in effect, revoking the
discharge, if in a subsequent proceeding the certificate of discharge "shall
be impeached for some fraud or wilful concealment ... of his property or
rights of property, as aforesaid, contrary to the provisions of this act." 208
The 1800 Act allowed for the revocation of the discharge if a creditor
later showed that it had been obtained "unfairly, and by fraud." 209 Thus, the
"fraud and wilful concealment" in section 4 of the 1841 Act appear to refer
to conduct connected to the bankruptcy proceeding, not to pre-bankruptcy
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. § 1, 5 Stat. at 440-41.
203. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. §§ 3 & 4, 5 Stat. at 442-44.
207. This is consistent with the way Senator Sherman described the flaws in the 1841 Act
when speaking against the 1867 Act (explaining how "men apparently wealthy suddenly took the
benefit of the bankrupt law, discharged themselves from all their liabilities, and soon after became
rich again"). CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1867).
208. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443-44.
209. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 34, 2 Stat. 19, 30-3 1.
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conduct.210 This is reinforced by the fact that the revocation provision
follows the provision of the Act imposing a duty on the debtor to submit to
an examination by his creditors as to "all matters relating to such bank-
ruptcy, and his acts and doings, and his property and rights of property,"
and making it perjury for the debtor to "wilfully and corruptly answer or
swear, or affirm, falsely," during the examination. 2 11
Thus, under the 1841 Act, the debtor's entitlement to a discharge was
still primarily linked to his post-bankruptcy conduct.2 12 The debtor, even a
voluntary debtor, received his discharge as long as he cooperated with his
creditors during the bankruptcy proceeding. 13 Pre-bankruptcy treatment of
those creditors was relevant to discharge only if the debtor had actually
preferred a creditor before the bankruptcy, and then only if a majority of the
non-preferred creditors decided to hold that against the debtor. 214 The
disqualification from voluntary bankruptcy of debtors with debts based on
certain acts of defalcation and embezzlement suggests that pre-bankruptcy
conduct can be generally relevant and that bankruptcy might attach legal
significance to the conduct that gives rise to a debt, but this concept was
still largely undeveloped in the 1841 Act.2 15
C. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1867
Although it had been more than a quarter of a century since the last
bankruptcy act, when Congress next turned to providing relief for American
debtors, it did so with vivid memories of the shortcomings of its previous
effort.216 Indeed, in 1867 there were members in both houses of Congress
who had been members of Congress during the passage of the 1841 Act.217
The Civil War had wreaked havoc on the American economy, most
obviously in the southern states, but northern merchants were also feeling
the pinch as thousands of their pre-war debtors in the South were unable to
meet their obligations. 21 8 Thus, although it was the desperate state of
210. This was certainly the view in 1867 of how these provisions in the 1841 Act worked.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1867) (statement of Sen. Poland), and later, at 1004
(statement of Sen. Poland).
211. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443-44.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess, 980 (1867).
217. Senators Lane from Indiana, Sumner from Massachusetts, and Fessenden from Maine,
were three senators who had been in Congress when it passed the 1841 Act.
218. "We all understand the condition of the country South.... That whole country is
broken down and impoverished. If there is any need of a bankrupt bill anywhere there is need of
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debtors in the southern states that necessitated the need for debtor relief,
there was strong support from northern interests for some form of national
debtor relief.219 However, there was much division regarding the form that
relief should take.220 The voluntary provisions in the 1841 Act had resulted
in an unimaginable rush of debtors to file for bankruptcy relief, most of
whom received a complete discharge of all of their debts.221 However,
making access to bankruptcy entirely dependent on creditor initiation of the
process had not been successful in the past and would not ensure that all
who needed and deserved some form of debt relief would get it.222
The bankruptcy law that ultimately attained the assent of a majority of
those in Congress in 1867 (1867 Act) was generally a more balanced
approach to debtor relief than the previous bankruptcy acts. 223 It included
both voluntary224 and involuntary proceedings, but it also gave creditors
more input into the voluntary process once initiated by the debtor and great-
ly expanded the power of creditors to prevent the debtor from receiving a
discharge.225 The 1867 Act also substantially reformulated the grounds on
which debtors could be refused a discharge and for the first time effectively
empowered individual creditors (other than the United States or the States
themselves) to protect their own interests by preventing the debtor from dis-
charging specific debts.226 Although the limits on debtors imposed under
the 1867 Act may have been based in part on the sentiment of some in Con-
gress that debtors who had fought against the United States in the Civil War
were entitled to no debt relief, for the most part they reflected the com-
promise agreed to by the pro-debtor and pro-creditor groups in Congress. 227
it there." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1005 (1867) (statement of Sen. Poland); see also
id. at 984 (statement of Sen. Johnson) and at 980 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
219. See, e.g., id. at 980 (statement of Sen. Wilson). "[T]hroughout the North ... there is a
large number of persons who are insolvent, with large indebtedness hanging over them." Id. at
979-80. The problem in the North was mainly a consequence of the impoverished state of the
South, which prevented the payment of a substantial amount of pre-war obligations owed by
Southern debtors. Id.
220. Id. at 980-83.
221. Only 765 of the over 33,000 debtors who filed did not get their discharge. Tabb, supra
note 181, at 353.
222. See supra Part IH.A-B.
223. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517.
224. Id. § 11, 14 Stat. at 521-22. A debtor had to have provable debts exceeding $300 to file
a voluntary petition. Id.
225. Id. § 29, 14 Stat. at 531-32. Section 29 set out seventeen grounds. Id.
226. Id. § 33, 14 Stat. at 533.
227. Senator Sumner of Massachusetts proposed to amend the bill to require that all volun-
tary debtors swear or affirm that they had "never voluntarily borne arms against the United States"
and that they had "not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government.., within the
United States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1005. Others also felt strongly about not
letting debtors in the southern states benefit from the bankruptcy act. Id. For example, Senator
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In all proceedings, the Act required as a condition to discharge that the
debtor's assets provide at least a fifty percent dividend on all claims assert-
ed against the debtor in bankruptcy, unless a majority of creditors in
number and amount consented to the discharge on less than a fifty percent
dividend.228 However, the Act provided that the minimum dividend condi-
tion on discharge did not apply in any case commenced within the first year
after the Act became effective.229 Congress later extended the grace period
first by amending the Act to provide that the minimum dividend condition
was not effective in cases filed before January 1, 1869,230 and then later by
amending the Act to provide that the minimum dividend condition did not
apply to debts incurred before January 1, 1869.231 In 1874, Congress elimi-
nated the minimum dividend requirement in involuntary cases and reduced
the required dividend to thirty percent in voluntary cases. 232 The Act also
permitted corporations to file for bankruptcy, but they were not entitled to a
discharge.233
The 1867 Act carried over the basic procedures for obtaining a dis-
charge, requiring the debtor to apply for discharge and allowing creditors to
contest the debtor's right to discharge at a hearing held after notice to
creditors of the debtor's application for a discharge. 234 However, section 29
of the Act included seventeen grounds upon which the debtor could be
denied a discharge, including the debtor's "convict[ion] of any mis-
demeanor under this act." 235 The Act identified nine misdemeanors which
could be committed after commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding;
however most of these involved the same acts of misconduct set out in
section 29 as specific grounds for denying the debtor's discharge. 236 Two
of the grounds for denying discharge in section 29 are based upon fraud;
first the debtor would not get a discharge "if he has been guilty of any fraud
or negligence in the care [or] custody... of the property belonging to him"
Pomeroy argued that the act would be strengthened "if leading and notorious rebels can be
excluded from the operations of the act." Id. Senator Howard stated: "The question is whether
that class of persons at the South, who have wilfully been engaged in making war upon the
Government of the United States for the purpose of overthrowing it, are now in justice and
morality entitled to this great act of jubilee on our part?" Id. at 1006.
228. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. at 533.
229. Id.
230. Bankruptcy Act of 1868, ch. 258, § 1, 15 Stat. 228.
231. Bankruptcy Act of 1870, ch. 263, § 1, 16 Stat. 276.
232. Bankruptcy Act of 1874, ch. 390, § 9, 18 Stat. 180.
233. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 37, 14 Stat. at 535.
234. Id. §§ 29, 31, 14 Stat. at 531-32.
235. Id. § 29, 14 Stat. at 531-32.
236. Id. § 44, 14 Stat. at 539.
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at the time the petition is filed.237 The debtor also would be denied a dis-
charge if he "has been guilty of any fraud whatever contrary to the true
intent of this act." 238 The act allowed a creditor with a provable claim up to
two years after the discharge was granted to contest the debtor's discharge
on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained.239 To get the discharge set
aside, the creditor had to establish that one of the grounds for denying
discharge in section 29 existed and that the creditor had no knowledge of
such grounds until after the discharge had been granted. 240
Section 33 of the Act set out the grounds upon which specific debts
could be excepted from discharge.241 No debt "created by the fraud or
embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or
while acting in any fiduciary character" was to be discharged. 242 On its
face, this section greatly enlarged the category of debts that had been
excepted from discharge under the 1841 Act.243 Although the Supreme
Court would later interpret the same clause in the 1898 Act as limiting the
fraud and embezzlement exceptions to debts based on wrongs by public
officers,244 it did not impose the same limitation in cases under the 1867
Act.245 There was no procedure for obtaining a determination from the
bankruptcy court that a specific debt was not dischargeable. 246 The certifi-
cate of discharge expressly excepted from the discharge, certified debts
"excepted from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy," but did not
identify which debts those might be.247 Instead, that matter was determined
in any subsequent suit on a provable debt against the debtor in which the
debtor raised his discharge as a defense; the creditor would then have the
burden of establishing in that litigation that its debt fell within the exception
to discharge set out in section 33 of the Act.248
237. Id. § 29, 14 Stat. at 531-32. However, several of the other grounds for denying
discharge were based on the debtor's "intent to defraud" or on "fraudulent" acts-for example,
"the making of any false or fraudulent entry" in the debtor's books, any "fraudulent payment,
[transfer] of his property, [or any] fraudulent preference." Id. § 29, 14 Stat. at 532.
238. Id.
239. Id. § 34, 14 Stat. at 533-34.
240. Id.
241. Id. § 33, 14 Stat. at 533.
242. Id.
243. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443-44.
244. See generally Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904).
245. See generally Ames v. Moir, 138 U.S. 306 (1891).
246. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. at 533. Section 32 provided that the
certificate of discharge approved by the court would note the debtor's discharge from all debts
"excepting such debts, if any, as are by said act excepted from the operation of a discharge in
bankruptcy." Id. § 32, 14 Stat. at 532-33.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 33, 14 Stat. at 533.
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Unlike the discharge provisions in the two previous acts, the discharge
provisions in the 1867 Act conditioned249 the debtor's discharge in part on
his conduct before bankruptcy; his cooperation during the case is still
important, but it is no longer the only conduct of interest.250 The debtor's
honesty now was measured by his conduct both before and after the bank-
ruptcy proceeding began.251 The shift in focus could be attributed to the
reluctance of members of Congress to reward southern "rebels" for their
recent transgressions against the United States.252 However, the arguments
made against helping southern debtors were more concerned with acts of
disloyalty than with acts of dishonesty. 253 To the extent that members ex-
pressed any concern about post-war conduct, it was based on their percep-
tions that southerners had not been sufficiently submissive in all things. 254
More likely, the shift in focus to pre-bankruptcy conduct was a reaction
to the abuses reported under the 1841 Act.255 As noted earlier, there was a
general perception that debtors had abused the voluntary proceedings pro-
vided in 1841, using the process to relieve themselves of all obligations
without losing much, if any, of their property. 256 Presumably that was
249. Id.
250. Id. § 29, 14 Stat. at 529.
251. Id.
252. For example, Senator Howard argued:
They threatened themselves at the beginning of the war that they would fight until
they were driven to the last ditch, until not a man, woman, or child should be left on
the soil of the South to tell the tale of their ultimate destruction if they should be
destroyed. We have driven them into the last ditch by force of arms. I am unwilling
now to turn around and say to these people, "I will discharge you from your honest
debts because you are insolvent," while at the same time I know that this insolvency
has been created by their own efforts to destroy my Government, and my country.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1006 (1867).
253. Id. at 1005.
254. Id. Some believed that the South was still in a state of rebellion. Id. For example,
Senator Sumner reported that "[tihere is not a mail which does not bring us reports of the grossest
insubordination in this rebel region, of injustice to neighbors, of cruelty to freedman." Id. Senator
Yates chastised those who suggested that southerners had capitulated and were deserving of the
benefits of the bankruptcy bill: "They have said this in the face of the fact that, while there have
been thousands of arrests in the southern States of men engaged in criminal prosecutions of loyal
Union men, not a solitary conviction can be found to have taken place in the courts there under the
rebel regime which there prevails." Id. at 1187. Senator Howard was even more outraged,
explaining that he had reports from people in Texas that within the last year "not less than fifteen
hundred deliberate murders [had been] committed by ex-rebels and guerrillas, and that class of
ruffians, and that not one single case had yet transpired of arrest and trial of one of those
offenders." Id.
255. Id. at 982.
256. Id. at 980. For example, Senator Davis remarked that under the 1841 Act in his state
(Kentucky), "hundreds of thousands of men that owed but a small amount of debt .... fraudu-
lently preferred the mode of liquidation by bankruptcy sooner than by labor and economy." Id. at
981. Of course, there were less than 34,000 voluntary cases filed in the entire country under the
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accomplished in part, by rather astute, or some would argue, "fraudulent,"
pre-bankruptcy planning. 257 The 1841 Act was weak on procedures aimed
at controlling the debtor's preparations for bankruptcy, however, and since
the discharge was not connected to such pre-bankruptcy conduct, there was
a powerful incentive to try and get away with as much as possible.258 Eight
of the nine exceptions to discharge in the 1867 Act that are based on pre-
bankruptcy conduct relate to pre-petition activity that would remove assets
from the reach of creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding or prevent
creditors from identifying assets.259 Several of these are linked to the broad
power provided in section 35 of the Act to avoid preferences and fraudulent
conveyances made "in contemplation of insolvency or bankruptcy." 260
Even though these provisions are based on pre-bankruptcy conduct, the
wrongs they address are wrongs to the bankruptcy process.261 The conduct
is not generally punishable outside of bankruptcy. State fraudulent con-
veyance statutes, for example, simply voided such transactions-in effect
punishing the transferee, not the debtor. However, they do reflect a more
refined effort at distinguishing between the honest debtor worthy of debt
relief and the dishonest debtor intent on abusing the process. 262 To protect
the process from abuse, it was necessary to get beyond the broad
generalizations about dishonest debtors:
[The Act] will enable the wild and reckless speculator, the
adventurer, and those who do not feel the obligations of their
debts, to take the benefit of the bill, and leave honest men who feel
their obligations to law and conscience and morality to stagger on
through life, having been impoverished by the frauds of
adventurers and fraudulent debtors. 263
1841 Act, and thus Senator Davis would appear to overstate his case against the voluntary
provisions in the 1867 Act. See Tabb, supra note 181, at 353.
257. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 981 (1867).
258. Id.
259. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533. Section 32 provided that the
certificate of discharge approved by the court would note the debtor's discharge from all debts
"excepting such debts, if any, as are by said act excepted from the operation of a discharge in
bankruptcy." Id. § 32, 14 Stat. at 532-33. The only exception that does not relate to pre-petition
activity is the gambling exception. Id. § 14, 14 Stat. at 522-23.
260. Id. § 35, 14 Stat. at 533.
261. Id. § 33, 14 Stat. at 533.
262. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 980 (1867).
263. Id. at 1190-91 (statement of Sen. Lane); see also id. at 1003 (noting that bankruptcy
legislation is generally seen as dishonest because it allows persons to repudiate a contract after
receiving the benefit of the contract) (statement of Sen. Fogg) and at 983 (stating "all those
[debtors] who are honest ... [will] struggle [to] pay their debts [and] all the dishonest debtors of
the country will avail themselves of the advantages of the [bankruptcy] law.") (statement of Sen.
Williams).
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Labeling every debtor seeking a discharge as dishonest was not
helpful. 264 Assessing the debtor's honesty and entitlement to a discharge,
based solely on post-bankruptcy conduct also did not provide a meaningful
measure.265 It is not surprising that of the 33,000 debtors who sought relief
under the 1841 Act, only 765 could not manage to play along with the
process. 266 However, the 765 debtors who got caught in 1842 were not
responsible for the widespread belief of debtor abuse that caused the repeal
of the 1841 Act after less than two years. 267
The 1867 Act also introduced the concept of "dishonest debts." 268
Dishonest debts were certain debts that were excepted from discharge based
on the debtor's conduct in creating them.269 Although the prior acts had
excepted all debts owed to the United States or to the individual states, the
exception was not based on any characterization of the debtor's conduct in
connection with such debts.270 The 1841 Act precluded debtors owing
debts "created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as
executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other
fiduciary capacity" from voluntary proceedings, but it did except such debts
from discharge in an involuntary proceeding. 271 The preclusion worked
more like a denial of the discharge in general, or an assessment of general
dishonesty based on the disqualifying conduct, because it denied access to
all debt relief under the Act.272 The 1867 Act turned the disqualification
into the first exception of a debt from discharge based on the debtor's pre-
bankruptcy conduct.
The later construction the Supreme Court placed on this exception
under the 1898 Act obfuscated its link to section 523 of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code. As used in the 1867 Act, fraud was not confined to acts of
public officials or fiduciaries, and the only limitation on its scope imposed
by the Supreme Court was the elimination of implied fraud as a ground for
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Only 765 did not receive a discharge. Tabb, supra note 181, at 353.
267. Id. The 1841 Act rapidly became unpopular. Id. The creditor class saw the great
crowds of debtors being discharged from debts without any adequate payment, and the admini-
stration of the debtor's estate was very expensive and entirely in the hands of the Courts and their
assignees instead of the creditors. Id. The debtor class itself found that while the Act preserved
all state liens, it had not preserved the various state exemptions of property from execution and
other protective provisions furnished by the States to debtors. WARREN, supra note 147, at 82.
268. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533.
269. Id.
270. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 5, 5 Stat. 440, 444-45.
271. Id. § 1,5 Stat. at441.
272. Id.
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invoking the exception.273 Indeed, the fraud that triggered the exception
under the 1867 Act was no different in nature than the fraud identified by
the Supreme Court in Field as falling within that term in section 523.
For example, in Ames v. Moir,274 the plaintiff delivered goods to the
defendant's place of business only to find when he returned for payment the
next day that much of what he had delivered the previous day had already
been shipped out of state. 275 The defendant did not pay for the goods,
eventually filing for bankruptcy. 276 When the defendant asserted his dis-
charge in the subsequent suit brought by the plaintiff to recover the price of
the goods delivered, the trial court held, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
that the debt was excepted from discharge because the defendant had
obtained the goods by fraud. 277 The Court noted that the defendant ordered
the goods knowing he was insolvent with the purpose of obtaining the
goods without paying for them and that he had received the goods with that
preconceived intent.278 Thus, the plaintiff had established the moral turpi-
tude of the defendant that was required to bring a debt based on such con-
duct within the fraud exception under the 1867 Act.279 The Court explained
that fraud, as used in the Act, "mean[t] positive fraud, or fraud in fact
involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong .... not implied fraud
[which is fraud that] may exist without the imputation of bad faith or
immorality." 280
Thus, if the fraud in § 523 is the same fraud that was used in the 1867
Act, Ames suggests that the § 523 fraud exception to discharge casts a very
broad net. This is especially true in light of the fact that in Ames, the Court
focused on what the defendant intended rather than on the nature of the
defendant's representation. 281 This suggests that the frantic search for a
representation by courts applying § 523 to credit card debts may overstate
the problem. Perhaps the representation problem is better addressed in
terms of the creditor's reliance by looking "holistically" at the cardholder's
relationship with the card issuer.
273. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1887).
274. 138 U.S. 306(1891).
275. Ames, 138 U.S. at 312.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 311.
281. Id.
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D. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act (1898 Act) in many ways embodied a
compromise of the major arguments for and against bankruptcy legislation
that had been made with respect to each of the three prior acts. 282 It was
eight years in the making and every Congress between 1890 and 1898
considered a national bankruptcy bill in one form or another. Several of
these bills were passed by one house or the other, but no general consensus
was reached in both houses until 1898.283 Although Congress debated
many of the details of the proposed act at some point during the eight years
that the legislation was pending, the major point of contention that delayed
passage of the act time and again was the disagreement over whether
bankruptcy should be purely voluntary or whether meaningful bankruptcy
legislation required an involuntary component. 284 At any given point, the
disagreement might have appeared class-based, 285 regionally-based, 286 or
simply partisan-based. 287
The Act as passed was a modified version of what had originally been
introduced in Congress as the Torrey Bill, named after the lawyer from St.
Louis who drafted it and who spent the next eight years rallying support for
his draft even though he himself was not a member of Congress. 288 The
Torrey Bill was the most comprehensive bankruptcy legislation that had
ever been proposed to Congress, addressing in elaborate detail everything
282. Tabb, supra note 181, at 363.
283. See H.R. REP. No. 55-65, at 25 (1897) (Committee on the Judiciary report on S. 1035,
55th Cong. (1897)).
284. See H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 8 (1896) (report of Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
8110, 54th Cong. (1896)).
285. For example, Senator Lindsey described opponents of bankruptcy legislation as "large
and selfish business establishments" who did not believe in "the discharge of honest debtors.., or
the application of equitable rules between them and their fellow creditors." 30 CONG. REC. 603
(1897). He saw the issue before the Senate as whether "at the dictation of a few great establish-
ments, we shall further postpone making the constitutional right to a bankruptcy law available to
the people, or proceed upon the theory of the greatest good to the greatest number." Id. Senator
Hoar noted that big creditors exacted preferential treatment from their debtors, ensuring that they
got paid and that "everyone else is left out in the cold to whistle" when debtors failed. Id. at 628;
see also 25 CONG. REC. App. 572 (1893) ("Can it be possible that such wholesale houses [those
worth millions] who now crush out their debtors financially when occasion requires, to the end
that they may get the entire property while other creditors with claims of equal merit get nothing,
oppose the law in the best interests of such debtors and other creditors?").
286. See 28 CONG. REC. App. 325 (1896) (statement of Rep. Walsh) and at 331 (statement of
Rep. Blue) and at 340 (statement of Rep. Newlands).
287. For example, on a number of occasions during this period, the debate over whatever
bankruptcy bill was pending turned into a debate over monetary policy-an issue that deeply
divided Congress along purely party lines. See 28 CONG. REC. App. 340-41 (1896) (statement of
Rep. Newlands); 30 CONG. REC. 630-35 (1897) (statement of Senator Stewart).
288. Torrey even published a bankruptcy magazine during the year preceding the passage of
the 1898 Act and later went on to fame as one of Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders.
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from bankruptcy jurisdiction to the specific holidays excluded from com-
putations of time under the Act. 289 The discharge provisions which sur-
vived passage, although scaled back from those originally proposed, were
detailed and complex. 290
The bill that was finally approved by both houses provided for involun-
tary bankruptcy. 291 The opposition to involuntary proceedings was based
on a firmly held belief by many in Congress that creditors would abuse the
process, and in the end, many would be forced into bankruptcy and finan-
cial ruin based on acts that the average person would not consider dishonest
nor deserving of punishment. 292 As originally proposed, the Torrey Bill
specified nine acts of bankruptcy that were grounds for bringing an
involuntary petition against a debtor, and opponents of the bill argued that
these acts were defined so broadly that they could be interpreted to include
many reasonable and responsible business or financial decisions.293
The proponents of the involuntary provisions insisted that creditors
needed the power in order to prevent abuse by both debtors and creditors.
An involuntary petition would allow creditors to freeze a debtor's assets for
the benefit of all creditors when the debtor had embarked on a plan to make
his assets available to selected creditors. 294 National creditors feared losing
out to local creditors who were likely to be favored by debtors in financial
difficulty. 295 The same fears were behind the argument that involuntary
bankruptcy would prevent the inequality that resulted when the first credi-
tors who pounced on a debtor were able to grab for themselves all of the
debtor's assets.296
The compromise finally agreed to include only five acts of bankruptcy,
four of which were based on acts by either the debtor or his creditors that
resulted in property being removed from the reach of most of the debtor's
creditors. 297 Several other provisions helped to temper the opposition to
289. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545 (repealed 1978); Id. § 1(14),
30 Stat. at 544 (defining holiday); Id. § 31, 30 Stat. at 554 (describing computation of time).
290. Id. §§ 14 & 17, 30 Stat. at 550-51.
291. Id. § 3, 30 Stat. at 546-47.
292. See, e.g., 25 CONG. REC. 2787-89 (1893); 28 CONG. REC. 4580 (1896) (statement of
Rep. Stone); 31 CONG. REC. 2313-15 (1898) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
293. See, e.g., 31 CONG. REC. 2313-15 (1898) (statement of Sen. Stewart); 25 CONG. REC.
2869 (1893) (statement of Rep. Boatner).
294. See, e.g., 28 CONG. REC. 4581-82 (1896) (statement of Rep. Connolly); H.R. REP. No.
55-65, at 36-37 (1897).
295. See 29 CONG. REC. 1893 (1897) (statement of Sen. Hoar); 30 CONG. REC. 629-30
(1897) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
296. See 30 CONG. REC. 603 (1897) (statement of Sen. Lindsey) and at 628 (statement of
Sen. Stewart).
297. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3, 30 Stat. 544, 546-47 (repealed 1978).
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involuntary bankruptcy. The debtor was given a claim for costs, expenses,
and damages if the court ended up dismissing the involuntary petition or if
the petitioning creditors withdrew the petition.298 Petitioning creditors who
asked the court to take control of the debtor's property pending the
adjudication on the petition were required to post a bond to cover costs,
expenses, and damages that the debtor suffered as a result of having
property taken away, in case the petition was ultimately dismissed.299
The discharge provisions of the Torrey Bill also came under attack by
those opposed to involuntary bankruptcy. 300 As originally proposed, the
Torrey Bill provided nine grounds upon which the debtor could lose his
discharge; however, one of the grounds provided for a loss of discharge if
the debtor "committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as herein
provided," and opponents asserted that because the act created thirty-four
new criminal offenses in reality more -than forty grounds existed for
denying the debtor a discharge. 301 This allowed opponents to argue that the
bill allowed creditors to force a debtor into bankruptcy, where all of his
property would be taken away and then deprive him of any benefit of the
proceeding by invoking any number of the forty-plus grounds to deny his
discharge. 302 To many in Congress, these provisions not only permitted
abuse by creditors, they also encouraged abuse by rewarding it.303 In the
compromise bill, there were only two grounds for denying the debtor his
discharge, 304 and only five offenses punishable by imprisonment. 305
Section 14 of the Act set out the basic discharge provisions. 306 The
debtor applied to the bankruptcy court for a discharge, and the judge held a
hearing on the application after notice to parties in interest. 307 At the hear-
ing on the debtor's application the judge would also consider "such proofs
and pleas as may be made in opposition", to the debtor's application for a
discharge. 308 The judge was instructed to "investigate the merits of the
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., 30 CONG. REC. 666-67 (1897) (statement of Sen. Nelson).
301. See 30 CONG. REC. 665 (1897) (statement of Sen. Nelson); 31 CONG. REC. 2314-15
(1898) (statement of Sen. Stewart). Senator Stewart asserted "[i]f they had had a Torrey in the
early days of the Roman Republic, it would not have taken centuries to reduce the Romans to
slavery and to destroy their independence." Id. at 2315.
302. See 30 CONG. REC. 665 (1897) (statement of Sen. Nelson); 31 CONG. REC. 2314-15
1898) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
303. See, e.g., 31 CONG. REc. 2315 (1898) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
304. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978).
305. Id. § 29, 30 Stat. at 554.
306. Id. § 14, 30 Stat. at 550.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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application" and to discharge the debtor unless the debtor had committed an
offense punishable by imprisonment under the Act or had, "in contem-
plation of bankruptcy," destroyed, concealed, or not kept records of his
financial condition with "fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial
condition." 309
Unlike the prior acts, the 1898 Act did not condition discharge on
creditor assent or on the payment of a minimum dividend.310 The debtor
received his discharge unless creditors could establish that the debtor, while
contemplating bankruptcy, had concocted a plan to keep his creditors from
accurately determining his financial condition, or that the debtor, while the
case was proceeding, had acted to conceal his assets or to otherwise
frustrate the bankruptcy process.31t Thus, the general discharge became
primarily a reward for the debtor who was honest about his financial affairs
and who cooperated when required after the case began.312
Section 17 of the Act embodied what was really a fundamental shift in
the philosophy of discharge. 313 In prior bankruptcy acts, the discharge was
conditioned on a generalized assessment of the debtor: honest debtors got
their discharge while dishonest debtors did not.314 The grounds for denying
the discharge were not debt-specific, but rather were based on conduct
inconsistent with a general characterization of a person as honest.315 This
general conceptualization made the discharge an all-or-nothing proposition.
There was no basis for distinguishing between debts when the conduct that
cost the debtor his discharge was not based on the debtor's relationship with
individual creditors. 316 This was especially true as long as the discharge
was designed to entice the debtor's cooperation during the proceeding and
therefore based on conduct that was directly related to the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. In section 17 of the 1898 Act, Congress excluded from discharge
specific categories of debts based on the conduct that gave rise to such
debts.317
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. § 17, 30 Stat. at 550.
314. Id.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 154-161 (discussing discharge under the 1800 Act),
notes 186-198 (discussing discharge under the 1841 Act), and notes 234-244 (discussing
discharge under the 1867 Act).
316. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 540, 550-51.
317. Id. Debts to the United States and the individual states had been excluded from
discharge under prior acts, but those exclusions were not based on the conduct that gave rise to the
debts. Id.
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What emerges from these provisions is a subset of the honest debtor
category. We no longer have simply honest or dishonest debtors. We now
have dishonest debtors, who still lose their discharge, honest debtors, who
still get their discharge, and debtors who have been honest in connection
with their bankruptcy proceeding but have been less than fair in their
dealings with specific creditors before bankruptcy. 318 These debtors have
earned their general discharge by cooperating during the case, but that
cooperation would not justify releasing them from the consequences of
certain unacceptable pre-bankruptcy conduct. 319
The discharge provisions in the 1898 Act reflected an evolving sense of
what we might call the "bankruptcy bargain." Originally that bargain con-
templated a release of debts in consideration for a turnover of property.320
The debtor was induced to live up to his part of the bargain by conditioning
the discharge on the debtor's cooperation-the debtor simply had to help
his creditors get a hold of his property. 321 However, giving debtors open
access to the process skewed the relative value of the consideration on
which the bargain rested, unless additional consideration was exacted from
the debtor. Voluntary bankruptcy allowed the debtor to affect how much
property he would have to turnover by removing property from his control
before filing, and unless the discharge was conditioned on pre-bankruptcy
conduct, the debtor would receive the agreed to consideration from his
creditors even though he had not lived up to his end of the bargain.322 The
1867 Act took a step toward re-balancing the consideration, but without
much effect apparently, as complaints of debtor abuse were one of the
contributing factors to its repeal. 323 The proponents of the bankruptcy
legislation in Congress during the 1890s were acutely aware of the problem
and believed they had a workable solution:
I am not one of those who dream that any legislation can make a
rascal an honest man. I know perfectly well that no power short of
that Divine power which gave sight to the blind and which healed
318. Id. §§ 15, 17, 30 Stat. at 550-51.
319. Id. § 17, 30 Stat. at 550-51.
320. H.R. REP. No. 52-1674, at 12 (1892) (to accompany H.R. 9348, 52d Cong. (1st Sess.
1892)).
321. Id.
322. Id.
A law that would permit a dishonest debtor to deliberately prepare for, and then go into,
bankruptcy without the possibility of interference on the part of his creditors, would be,
in our judgment, in a very great degree destructive of the true interests of the great bulk
of the men who conduct transactions on credit, both as creditors and debtors.
Id. at9.
323. See, e.g., 28 CONG. REC. 4587 (1896).
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the sick can make a rascal honest; but I do believe that it is within
the reach of practical statesmanship to make a rascal act honestly
by making it to his interest for him to do so. We attempt to do that
by offering to every insolvent debtor his financial emancipation if
he will place his property in the hands of an assignee for the
benefit of his creditors. 324
Some were not as conciliatory in their statement of the problem and
proposed solution:
A debtor may now, almost without restraint, engage in reckless
speculation, buy goods not intending to pay for them, and make
away with his assets with but small risk of punishment; under the
proposed act such conduct, if the creditors protect their interests,
will result in a liquidation of his estate, the refusal of a discharge,
and in his punishment; the effect will be a diminution of illegiti-
mate transactions and the promotion of conservative methods in
the affairs of commerce. 325
Despite the considerable attention given to the problem throughout the
entire period that Congress was considering a new bankruptcy law, the
1898 Act as enacted provided only two grounds upon which the debtor's
discharge could be denied. 326 A debtor was not entitled to receive a dis-
charge if he had committed a bankruptcy offense as defined in section 29 of
the Act, or if he had "with fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial
condition and in contemplation of bankruptcy" destroyed or concealed the
records necessary to determine "his true financial condition." 327  As
originally introduced, the bill that became the 1898 Act provided nine
grounds for denying the debtor a discharge, two of which had not been
included in any prior act. 328 The two new grounds were very far reaching: a
debtor who had obtained property on credit on the basis of a false writing or
had, in contemplation of bankruptcy, transferred property other than in the
ordinary course of his business was not entitled to a discharge.329
Opponents of the involuntary provisions argued that the grounds for
denying discharge were so closely related to the acts of bankruptcy on
which an involuntary petition could be based that, in effect, no one forced
324. 28 CONG. REC. 4627 (1896) (statement of Rep. Bailey).
325. H.R. REP. No. 52-1674, at 6 (1892).
326. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 544, 550.
327. Id.
328. H.R. REP. No. 55-65, at 7 (1897).
329. Id.
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into bankruptcy by his creditors would be entitled to a discharge. 330 For
those who believed that the involuntary provisions were an invitation for
creditors to abuse the process by punishing helpless debtors, it was out-
rageous that such debtors, after having been forced into a proceeding that
required them to give up all of their property, would never be discharged. 331
In the end, it appears that the proponents of involuntary bankruptcy were
willing to compromise in order to obtain a preemptive form of creditor
protection that was within the exclusive control of the creditors themselves.
However, the compromise that guaranteed involuntary proceedings came at
a cost to the process as a whole. Instead of re-balancing the bankruptcy
bargain to offset the significant advantage debtors had obtained with open
access to bankruptcy, the 1898 Act actually took a step back to 1841 and
conditioned the discharge on nothing more than the debtor's cooperation
during the proceeding. 332
The 1898 Act left it to individual creditors to protect their own interests
in the bankruptcy bargain, but at the individual level, the interests were
different. This re-allocation of responsibility for policing the honesty of
debtors reflects a more refined concept of the dishonest debtor, which
appears to be based on a distinction between wrongs to the bankruptcy sys-
tem and wrongs to individual creditors. The system is harmed by conduct
that works to defeat the general expectations of creditors: the debtor will
deliver up to the bankruptcy court for the benefit of his creditors all of his
assets. 333 When the debtor, in contemplation of getting a discharge in
bankruptcy, attempts to preempt the redistribution of his assets that would
occur in bankruptcy he has harmed his creditors in general, and thus the
bankruptcy system itself. The same is true when the debtor refuses to
cooperate during the bankruptcy proceeding. In contrast, unfair, even dis-
honest, treatment of an individual creditor did not harm the expectations of
the other creditors, it actually may have benefited them, so there was no
reason the other creditors should receive the additional benefits that resulted
330. See 31 CONG. REC. 2314-15 (1898) (statement of Sen. Stewart); 30 CONG. REc. 666-67
(1897) (statement of Sen. Nelson); 28 CONG. REc. 4580 (1896) (statement of Rep. Ray); 25
CONG. REc. 2788 (1893) (statement of Rep. Stone); 25 CONG. REC. 2869 (1893) (statement of
Rep. Bailey).
331. See 31 CONG. REC. 2314-15 (1898) (statement of Sen. Stewart); 30 CONG. REC. 666-67
(1897) (statement of Sen. Nelson); 28 CONG. REC. 4580 (1896) (statement of Rep. Ray); 25
CONG. REC. 2788 (1893) (statement of Rep. Stone); 25 CONG. REC. 2869 (1893) (statement of
Rep. Bailey).
332. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 544, 550.
333. See, e.g., the discharge provision in the substitute bill offered for H.R. 8110 in 1896
(H.R. 8234), which provides that debtor's discharge may be denied for acts by the debtor "done or
suffered to be done by such debtor respecting his business or estate to prevent pro rata distribution
of his estate among his creditors." 28 CONG. REC. 4756 (1896).
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when the debtor was denied his discharge in general. No direct harm to the
system itself occurred and thus there was no basis for imposing a "system-
protecting" sanction.
However, the exceptions to the discharge of individual debts that had
been provided by previous acts were not broad enough to accommodate the
re-allocation of policing responsibility. The previous acts excepted only
government debts and debts based on misconduct of public officers or
fiduciaries.334 As originally introduced, the Torrey Bill provided no addi-
tional exceptions. By 1896, however, two new exceptions had been added
to the bankruptcy bill pending in Congress: debts not scheduled by the
debtor and "judgments in actions for frauds or willful and malicious injuries
to the person or property of another" were excepted from discharge.335
The term fraud was not defined in the act, but based on the use of the
term in connection with the bankruptcy legislation considered by Congress
between 1890 and 1898, "fraud" was a general term for dishonesty. 336 For
example, the 1896 version of the Torrey Bill included a definition for the
term "defeat" that was the operative term in several of the acts of
bankruptcy proposed: when the debtor undertook certain acts with the
intent to "defeat his creditors" an involuntary petition could be filed.337
Defeat was defined in section 1 of the bill to "include defraud or delay,
evade, hinder, and impede with intent to defraud." 338 The House Judiciary
Committee explained that from the term "defeat" could be inferred "an evil
intent" because "by a reference to the definition of defeat ... it will be
found that it includes the element of fraud."339 Indeed, through this period
the acts of bankruptcy are collectively referred to as acts of fraud: "it will be
334. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 62, 2 Stat. 19, 36 (excepting debts owed to the
United States or any of the States); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 5, 5 Stat. 440, 444 (excepting
debts owed to the United States); Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533
(excepting debts created by the debtor's financial wrongdoing as a public official or when acting
in a fiduciary capacity).
335. H.R. 8110, 54th Cong. § 16 (1896); H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 29 (1896).
336. See H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 10 (1896) (report of the Committee on the Judiciary on
H.R. 8110, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896)); see also H.R. REP. No. 52-1674, at 12 (1892) (report of
the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 9348, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892)) (equating acts of
bankruptcy with fraud and noting how involuntary provisions are necessary to prevent a dishonest
debtor from preparing for bankruptcy "to the detriment of his creditors."); 31 CONG. REC. 6434
(1898) (statement of Rep. Ray); 30 CONG. REc. 602 (1897) (statement of Sen. Lindsay); 28
CONG. REc. 4584-85 (1896) (statement of Rep. Connolly).
337. H.R. 8110, 54th Cong. § 16 (1896); H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 29 (1896).
338. H.R. 8110, 54th Cong. § 1 (1896); H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 29 (1896).
339. H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 11 (1896) (report of Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
8110); see also the exchange between Rep. Stone and Rep. Ray at 29 CONG. REC. 4580 (1896).
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necessary to prove as one of the facts, before a person can be adjudged a
bankrupt, that he had committed fraud." 340
Interestingly, at the same time that "fraud" appears as a basis for
excepting a debt from discharge, "knowingly and fraudulently" obtaining
property in contemplation of bankruptcy with no intent to pay for it appears
as a bankruptcy offense punishable by the bankruptcy court.341 Because
bankruptcy offenses were also grounds for denying the debtor his discharge,
this would suggest that obtaining property with no intent to pay was not
included in the concept of fraud, as it would not be necessary to except such
a debt from discharge if no discharge had been granted. 342 Likewise,
obtaining property on credit by use of a "materially false statement in
writing" can be excluded from the term fraud based on its inclusion as a
ground for denying the debtor's discharge. 343 Senator Hoar, the floor
manager of the revised Torrey Bill in the Senate, equated this last ground
with false pretenses, a "criminal offense in most of the states." 344
Two substitutes for the revised Torrey Bill, introduced in the Senate
during this same Congress, support excluding intent not to repay from the
definition of fraud. The Senate Judiciary Committee proposed a substitute
for the House bill that excepted from discharge "any debt or obligation
created by the obtaining of money or property under false pretenses," with
no mention of fraud.345 The same exception to discharge was part of a
substitute for the Committee bill that was introduced by Senator Nelson. 346
Neither substitute contained a provision that made obtaining property with
no intent to pay for it a bankruptcy offense or a provision that made obtain-
ing credit on the basis of a false writing a ground for denying the debtor's
discharge. However, if "false pretenses" as used in these substitutes was
derived from the same "criminal offense" as Senator Hoar's ground for
denying discharge, then certainly false pretenses included obtaining
property with no intent to pay for it.
The 1898 Act was finally passed by Congress after a conference com-
mittee met and agreed on a compromise that worked out the differences in
the bills that had been passed by each chamber. The House had approved
an amended version of the revised Torrey Bill that it had passed in the last
340. H.R. REP. No. 52 1674, at 11-12 (1892).
341. H.R. 8100, 54th Cong. § 29 (1896); H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 33 (1896).
342. H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 33 (1896).
343. Id. at 29.
344. 29 CONG. REc. 1894 (1897) (statement by Sen. Hoar).
345. 29 CONG. REc. 1829 (1897).
346. Id. at 1831.
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Congress. 347 The amendments included making several of the bankruptcy
offenses grounds for objecting to the debtor's discharge, but the no-intent-
to-pay offense was not one of those transferred to the discharge section. 348
It was, however, removed from the list of offenses in the bill agreed to in
conference. 349 Perhaps the concern expressed by Representative Stone
several years earlier had carried the day: "under that provision the intent
will be construed by the act, and if the bankrupt obtains property which he
did not pay for, it would be very easy for... creditors, and for the judge
even to say that he never intended to pay for it."350 The House conferees, in
their report on the bill agreed to in conference, explained the changes to the
discharge provisions of the act:
The House amendment to the Senate bill provided that a bankrupt
should not receive a discharge from any of his debts if he had...
obtained property by false statements or representations ....
These provisions are stricken out, but in the bill as agreed upon the
general discharge of the bankrupt will not release him from any
debt created by or judgment obtained and based on any of the acts
referred to.351
The false statement ground for denying discharge in the House bill was
limited to statements in writing, and there was no such express limitation in
the new exception to discharge provision that the conferees believed had re-
placed it.352 As noted earlier, some in Congress equated obtaining credit on
the basis of false written statements with the crime of false pretenses. Thus
to carry the false written statement ground forward as an exception to dis-
charge would only have required excepting debts based on false pretenses.
However, the new exception to discharge also included fraud and false
representations. 353 Congress therefore must have intended the additional
terms to cover conduct that did not fall within the offense of false pretenses.
The other grounds for denying discharge that were eliminated from the
House bill by the conference committee addressed pre-bankruptcy conduct
that was intended to remove property of the debtor from the reach of his
creditors. To the extent that this conduct was included in the new exception
347. See H.R. REP. NO. 55-65, at 25 (1897) (recommending that the text of the Senate bill be
stricken and that the old H.R. 8100 be inserted with amendments).
348. Id. at 26.
349. Id. at 7.
350. 25 CONG. REC. 2788 (1893). The offenses moved by the House to the discharge
provisions were transferred back to section 29 in the conference bill. 31 CONG. REc. 6428 (1898).
351. 31 CONG. REc. 6428 (1898).
352. Id.
353. Id.
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to discharge provision, it must have been considered fraud.354 This would
be consistent with the view expressed in Congress that fraud involved con-
duct that harmed creditors generally; 355 preferring certain creditors and
transferring property in contemplation of bankruptcy and outside the
ordinary course denuded the estate that would be available in bankruptcy
for distribution to creditors. 356 This is precisely what makes such conduct a
bad fit for inclusion in the exceptions to discharge, which are intended to
protect individual creditors from dishonest debtors; the dishonesty here is
confined to the specific debtor-creditor relationship and the debt it created.
Additionally, because this conduct usually occurs after the debt has been
created, there is no apparent relationship between the conduct and the debt,
and thus no reason to except a specific debt from discharge based on such
conduct.
The contradiction inherent in making a general wrong grounds for
excepting a specific debt from discharge would explain the changes made to
both the discharge and exceptions to discharge sections in 1903.357 By
burying conduct that harmed creditors generally in the exception to dis-
charge provisions, Congress had effectively eliminated it as a consideration
in determining whether the debtor was entitled to a discharge. 358 Unlike the
1867 Act, which made similar conduct a bankruptcy offense and thus
grounds for denying the debtor a discharge, the bankruptcy offenses in-
cluded in the 1898 Act were confined to post-bankruptcy conduct. 359 In
response to the "general complaint that the present law lets too many rogues
escape from their debts, that it is weak in its discharge features," 360
Congress made substantial amendments to both the discharge and excep-
tions to discharge provisions of the Act.361 Four additional grounds for
denying the debtor's discharge were added to section 14.362 Two of these
were grounds that had been stricken by the conference committee in 1898:
obtaining money or property by the use of a materially false statement in
writing and fraudulent transfers of the debtor's property within twelve
354. It would not have been considered a false representation since no representation was
involved.
355. See 30 CONG. REc. 669 (1897) (statement of Sen. Nelson), and at 699-700 (statement
of Sen. Lindsay); 29 CONG. REC. 1892, 1894 (1897) (statement of Sen. Hoar); 28 CONG. REC.
4644-45 (1896) (quoting from S. REP. No. 53-206 (1985)), and at 4637, and at 4627 (statement of
Rep. Bailey).
356. 28 CONG. REC. 4627 (statement of Rep. Bailey).
357. Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797.
358. Id. § 17, 32 Stat. at 798.
359. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 544, 550.
360. H.R. REP. No. 57-1698, at 6 (1902).
361. Id.
362. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797, 797-98.
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months of bankruptcy. 363 These two grounds, of course, were supposed to
have been picked up by the fraud exception to discharge in section 17 of the
1898 Act. 364 That view of fraud had not prevailed, however, and dishonest
debtors who were not intended to escape from all of their liabilities had
been discharged.
At the same time Congress added back two of the grounds for denying
discharge that were removed in the compromise of 1898, it deleted "fraud"
as a basis for excepting a debt from discharge.365 Although the 1903
amendment excepted several additional debts from discharge, none of the
new grounds covered conduct that would have been included in the term
fraud. 366 This change would be consistent with a view of "fraud" as a
category of conduct that harmed creditors in general, which was more
appropriately addressed in terms of the debtor's discharge in general. 367 A
harm to creditors in general required a remedy that was available to all
creditors. All creditors, in theory at least, benefited from the denial of the
debtor's discharge. Congress may have recognized that it could not simply
lump all frauds together and assign them to one discharge provision or the
other. Rather, the nature of the fraud and of the conduct that gave rise to
the fraud determined its relationship to the debtor's discharge. 368 Thus,
although fraud was useful to describe a broad range of conduct that would
warrant labeling a debtor dishonest, the term was too indefinite to provide a
practical basis for distinguishing between conduct that harmed creditors in
general and conduct that harmed specific creditors.
IV. THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE IN § 523(A)(2)(A)
DOES NOT CREATE AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR
EXCEPTING CREDIT CARD DEBT FROM DISCHARGE
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1978 Act) distinguishes between
wrongs done to the system and wrongs done to individual creditors more
distinctively than the prior acts. Comparing the grounds for denying the
debtor's discharge set out in section 727 with the debts excepted from
363. Id. The other two new grounds provided the debtor was not entitled to a discharge (1) if
he had been discharged in another proceeding within six years, and (2) if he had refused to obey a
court order or to answer any questions approved by the court. Id.
364. 31 CONG. REC. 6428 (1898).
365. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. at 797-98.
366. Id.
367. 31 CONG. REC. 1374-75 (1903) (striking fraud from section 17 and retaining the actions
of false pretenses and false representations). I -
368. One member of Congress noted during the House debate jn the proposed amendments
that "there are many other frauds, of course, besides false pretenses and false representations." 36
CONG. REC. 1375 (1903) (statement of Rep. Mann).
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discharge in § 523 suggests that Congress intended to avoid the conceptual
overlap that had plagued previous efforts to distinguish between dishonest
acts that were an affront to the system as a whole and acts that should not
be rewarded, even if they did not undermine the integrity of the process
itself. Thus, for example, the debtor's use of a false statement in writing to
obtain property is no longer a basis for depriving him of his discharge.
Instead, the debt created by the creditor's reliance on that written statement
can be excepted from the debtor's discharge. A closer look at §
523(a)(2)(A) reveals that "fraud" has reappeared as an exception to dis-
charge, but this time the term appears to be limited; only "actual fraud" will
except a debt from discharge under the 1978 Act. Does § 523 include the
"many other frauds ... besides false pretenses and false representations,"
that were thought to be included in section 17 of the 1898 Act before it was
amended?369
Work on what became the 1978 Act began in the early seventies when
Congress created the National Bankruptcy Commission "to study, analyze,
evaluate, and recommend changes" to the 1898 Act.370 The Commission
reported back to Congress three years later and proposed a complete over-
haul of the bankruptcy system in the United States.371 One of the Commis-
sion's findings was that the discharge and exception to discharge provisions
in the 1898 Act were out of touch with the needs of debtors and creditors.372
The problem was not so much with section 14 and the grounds for denying
the debtor a discharge, but rather the exceptions to discharge in section 17
of the 1898 Act.373 In part this resulted from creditor abuse of those
provisions and in part from a new kind of debtor abuse made possible by
availability of easy credit. 374 The Commission identified an abusive prac-
tice that would later be labeled "loading up" by Congress: "consumer credit
buying sprees followed by bankruptcy." 375 To address these abuses, the
Commission proposed several modifications to section 17.376
First, an exception to discharge for non-consumer debts was created
"for obtaining money, property, or services ... by (A) fraud or false pre-
tenses or false representations or (B) use of a materially false statement in
369. Id.
370. Pub. L. No. 91-354, July 24, 1970.
371. Report of the Comm'n on the Bankr. Laws of the United States, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137
pt. II (1973); B Collier on Bankr. (MB) App. pt. 4(c), at 4-219 (2001).
372. B Collier on Bankr. (MB) App. pt. 4(c), at 4-431 (2001).
373. Id. at 4-422, 4-429 to 4-433.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 4-422.
376. Id.
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writing respecting [the debtor's] financial condition." 377 The Commission
explained that the revised exception to discharge was "identical to the
corresponding portion of section 17(a)(2), except for the addition of the
word 'fraud,' removed from section 17(a)(4) of the present Act" and placed
in "a more appropriate location" in clause (2).378 No explanation of what
"fraud" the Commission intended to move into clause (2) was provided.379
The Commission also proposed eliminating the use of a false statement in
writing as a ground for denying discharge but retaining it as an exception to
discharge for non-consumer debts.
Second, the Commission proposed an entirely new exception to dis-
charge to address the abuse of "loading up." Under this exception, no debt
"for obtaining money, property, or services within 90 days before the date
of the petition without the intention, at the time it was incurred, to pay the
debt and in contemplation of the filing of a petition under this Act ......
would be discharged.380 The Commission noted that this exception "ap-
plied to both consumer and business debts," and was "intended specially to
deny the discharge of debts which a debtor never intended to pay and the
liability for which he planned to avoid by obtaining a discharge." 381
If "fraud" includes an implied representation of intent to pay for credit
extended when no such intent exists-as courts adopting the implied repre-
sentation doctrine have asserted-why did the Commission need a separate
exception to discharge to capture such conduct? The exclusion of consumer
debts from the Commission's fraud exception would require another
exception to cover consumer debts incurred with no intent to pay; the Com-
mission made clear however that business debts were included in both
exceptions, which can only mean that the Commission would not have
considered the implied representation doctrine to be part of the fraud
exception to discharge. What then would the term fraud add to the excep-
tion for false pretenses or false representations? More than likely, the
answer is simply that fraud remained an euphemism for dishonest conduct,
conduct that was legally relevant only when viewed in terms of the bank-
ruptcy bargain. 382 Indeed, this is consistent with the generalized notion of
fraud used by the Commission in its report. 383 For example, the Commis-
377. Id. at 4-706 (quoting section 4-506(a)(2) of the Commission Bill).
378. Id. at 4-708 & 4-709, notes 2 & 11.
379. Id. at 4-709, note 11.
380. Id. at 4-706 (quoting section 4-506(a)(3) of the Commission Bill).
381. Id. at 4-709, note 8.
382. Id. at 4-330.
383. Id.
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sion considered "deterrents and sanctions against fraud and other dishonest
conduct" as one of the important internal goals of a bankruptcy law.384
Congress eventually agreed with the Commission that the 1898 Act
was in need of major revision:
The last major revision of the Bankruptcy Act was in 1938, before
any significant amount of consumer credit had been extended. In
the post-War years, consumer credit has become a major industry,
and buying on time has become a way of life for a large segment
of the population. The bankruptcy rate among consumers has
risen accordingly, but without the required provisions in the
Bankruptcy Act to protect those who need bankruptcy relief.385
It was quick to point out, however, that the 1978 Act was "not pri-
marily a debtor's bill," and the Reports of both Houses admit that debtors
have been known to abuse the process. 386 Noting that Congress had re-
jected the Commission's proposal to exclude consumer debts from the false
financial statement exception to discharge, the House Report explained that
"[t]his bill recognizes, however, that there are actual instances of consumer
fraud, and that creditors should be protected from fraudulent debtors." 387
But Congress did not adopt the Commission's recommendation that was
best suited to address what the Commission had identified as the most seri-
ous form of consumer fraud: loading up before bankruptcy. 388 Section 523
of the 1978 Act did not include the no intent to pay exception to discharge
that the Commission had proposed.389 Congress did, however, add fraud to
the false pretenses/false representations exception to discharge in §
523(a)(2)(A) of the new act as recommended by the Commission.390 It also
eliminated the use of a false statement in writing as a ground for denying
the debtor's discharge and instead incorporated into § 523 a revised excep-
tion to discharge based on the debtor's use of false financial statements. 39 1
The Committee Reports generated by each House for the 1978 Act
provide no insight into what Congress intended to accomplish by adding
fraud to the false pretenses/false representation exception to discharge in §
384. Id.
385. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966.
386. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 131 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6092.
387. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 131 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6092.
388. Report of the Comm'n on the Bankr. Laws of the United States, H.R. DOC. No. 93-137
pt. HI, at 139 (1973).
389. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549, 2590
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. II 1978)).
390. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
391. Id. § 523(a)(2)(B).
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523(a)(2)(A). Indeed, Congress modified the Commission proposal by
adding not just "fraud," but "actual fraud."392 The Committee Reports note
simply that "This provision [§ 523] is modified only slightly from current
Section 17(a)(2). First, 'actual fraud' is added as a grounds for exception
from discharge." 393 But this statement appears to contradict the statement
that immediately precedes it in the Reports: "As under Bankruptcy Act §
17(a)(2), a debt for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension or
renewal of credit by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud .... is excepted from discharge."394 If actual fraud was included in
section 17(a)(2), then adding the term "actual fraud" had no substantive
effect on the exception. As previously noted, the term fraud by itself had
not been used in this context to denote specific conduct, but rather had been
used to describe a broad range of conduct considered dishonest-conduct
that made us question the propriety of letting a debtor free himself from his
debts.395 This broad category of conduct was not limited to conduct that
harmed an individual creditor, but it included conduct that harmed creditors
in general. 396 Of course making this later conduct a basis for excepting a
specific debt had not been effective in the past to prevent dishonest debtors
from receiving a discharge. 397
More likely the added term was intended to make clear that the false
pretenses/false representations exception to discharge was limited in a way
that arguably excluded the implied representation doctrine, or others like it,
from § 523(a)(2)(A). As Representative Edwards explained to the House
when he reported on the compromise agreed to by members of both houses
who had met to work out the differences between the House and Senate
versions of the 1978 Act, § 523(a)(2)(A) was "intended to codify current
case law e.g., Neal v. Clark .... which interprets 'fraud' to mean actual or
positive fraud rather than fraud implied in law." 398 Although the implied
representation doctrine is not implied in.law fraud per se, allowing a
creditor to use it to establish false pretenses/false representations would
conflict with Edwards' exhortation in the preceding sentence that "each of
the provisions of section 523(a)(2) must be proved.
392. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
393. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320; S.
REP. No. 95-989, at 78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5864.
394. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 328-330.
396. H.R. REP. No. 52-1674, at 6 (1892).
397. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320.
398. 124 CONG. REC. HI 1089 (Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6453.
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Thus, under section 523(a)(2)(A) a creditor must prove that the debt
was obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other
than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition." 399 In effect, there is no basis under § 523(a)(2)(A) for implying
false pretenses/false representations from the debtor's general dishonesty.
The fact that a court could characterize the debtor's conduct as dishonest
under the circumstances does not provide a basis for excepting a debt from
discharge.
The addition of § 523(a)(2)(C) six years after Congress passed the
1978 Act supports this view. By the end of 1981, it had become apparent
that § 523(a)(2) had failed to deter debtors from "loading up" with credit
card debt on the eve of bankruptcy. A Senate Report on proposed amend-
ments to the 1978 Act that were pending before Congress in 1982 noted that
a debtor planning to file bankruptcy "has a strong economic incentive to
incur dischargeable debts" and thus "will go on a credit buying spree in
contemplation of bankruptcy at a time when the debtor is, in fact, insol-
vent."40 0 The report goes on to assert that creditors would not extend credit
to such debtors "if they knew the true facts," concluding thai "it is often
difficult to prove that such debts are fraudulent." 401 The solution proposed
was to make debts incurred during this pre-bankruptcy period presump-
tively nondischargeable. 402 The debtor could rebut the presumption by
showing that the debts were not incurred in contemplation of a discharge in
bankruptcy. 40 3 In other words, the presumption was rebuttable if the debtor
established that he did not incur the debt with the intention not to pay. 40 n
By the time it passed Congress in 1984, the "loading up" amendment to §
523(a)(2) had been limited to purchases of "luxury good or services"
aggregating more than $500 and cash advances under an open-end credit
plan aggregating more than $1000.405
If § 523(a)(2)(A) incorporates the implied representation doctrine, §
523(a)(2)(C) is superfluous. Proving that loading up was nondischargeable
would not be difficult. The factors that have been invented to establish the
debtor's intent not to pay provide ample means for creditors to demonstrate
that the debtor loaded up in contemplation of the bankruptcy discharge.
399. Id.
400. S. REP. No. 97-446, at 19 (1982).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 20.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (2000) (showing present aggregate amounts of $1075 for
luxury goods or services and $1075 for cash advances).
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The difficulty in proof was not a product of having to establish the debtor's
intent. Creditors seeking to except from discharge a debt based on a false
financial statement have to establish the debtor caused the statement to "be
made or published with intent to deceive." 406 Apparently, it has not been
difficult to prove fraud when the debtor uses a false financial statement to
obtain money, property, services or credit because Congress has created no
presumption that such debts are nondischargeable. 407 Moreover, the bills to
amend the 1978 Act that are currently pending before Congress would
extend the § 523(a)(2)(C) presumption of nondischargeability to debts
incurred within ninety days of bankruptcy. 408 This will ease further the
creditor's burden of punishing a debtor who loads up on the eve of bank-
ruptcy, a burden that would not need legislative relaxation if the implied
representation doctrine were incorporated into § 523(a)(2)(A).
What § 523(a)(2)(C) suggests is that only Congress can eliminate the
hurdles card issuers face when pursuing cardholders under § 523(a)(2).
Only Congress can make actionable "fraud" implied from conduct that the
rest of us might consider dishonest. Using the term "fraud" to justify new
exceptions to discharge is inconsistent with the historical use of that term in
American bankruptcy law. Divining specific content from a term that
consistently has been used to reflect only general perceptions of public
morality is something that even Congress has been unwilling to do.409
Surely the courts are not better equipped for this task than is Congress.
406. Id. § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv).
407. Id. § 523(a)(2).
408. See id. § 523(a)(2)(C) (showing current period of presumption to be debts incurred sixty
days before filing for bankruptcy).
409. In 1892 the House Report on the bankruptcy bill then pending before the House (H.R.
9348) explained that "[a] debtor frequently commits moral, and, occasionally legal, wrongs with
regard to his property in the protection of his dependents" but noted that "[a] bankruptcy law
should be limited to the determination of the question whether the property of an individual...
should or should not be administered for the benefit of the creditors, because of fraudulent acts...
and as to the punishment of those who have done wrong in contemplation of bankruptcy." H.R.
REP. No. 52-1674, at 4, 6 (1892).
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